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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide further evidence on the low volatility anomaly by examining 
its existence during the period from 1974 to 2013 as well as during defined periods of rising and 
declining stock markets. This thesis clarifies whether low volatility stocks outperform high volatility 
stocks in absolute return terms, or only in risk-adjusted return terms. Furthermore, this thesis 
studies whether there is an excess demand for high volatility stocks, a potential reason for the 
anomaly, by examining U.S. equity mutual funds and mutual funds’ allocations. In particular, this 
thesis examines whether an average portfolio manager has an overweight in high volatility stocks 
relative to the market portfolio, and additionally, an underweight in low volatility stocks.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data used to examine the low volatility anomaly and mutual fund holdings is sourced from 
several sources within the WRDS database. My sample comprises common stocks listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the period from 1973 to 2013 consisting of 4,266 stocks on 
average per month. I calculate historical monthly volatilities for the stocks, and every month, sort 
the stocks in an ascending order into deciles based on the historical volatilities. I calculate the 
performance of these decile portfolios and study the relationship between volatility and expected 
return. The CRSP mutual fund holdings data comprises U.S. mutual fund holdings reports from 
2002 to 2013. I include funds that have 80% to 100% of their total net assets invested in U.S. 
equities. I examine funds’ exposures to the sorted volatility deciles and compare the exposures to 
the construction of the market portfolio to determine the relative weights in low and high volatility 
stocks.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The results indicate that low volatility stocks offer clearly higher risk-adjusted returns, measured as 
the Sharpe ratio, and significantly higher alphas than high volatility stocks. The bottom volatility 
decile also outperform the top volatility decile in absolute return terms. Furthermore, Sharpe ratios 
are almost monotonously decreasing with volatility. However, volatility and absolute returns are 
positively related except for the highest volatility deciles, for which the absolute returns are 
decreasing with volatility. On average, U.S. mutual funds have a moderate overweight in high 
volatility stocks and a significant underweight in low volatility stocks. Therefore, a moderate excess 
demand for high volatility stocks and a notable demand shortage for low volatility may actually be 
the underlying reason why the anomaly exists. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on täydentää matalan riskin anomaliaa koskevaa kirjallisuutta tutkimalla 
matalan volatiliteetin anomaliaa vuosina 1974-2013 sekä erikseen eri markkinaolosuhteissa. Tutkin, 
tuottaako matalan volatiliteetin osakkeet korkean volatiliteetin osakkeita paremmin ainoastaan 
riskikorjatulla tuotolla mitattuna vai myös absoluuttisesti mitattuna.  Lisäksi tutkin, kohdistuuko 
korkean volatiliteetin osakkeisiin ylikysyntää, mitä pidetään mahdollisena syynä ilmiölle. 
Ylikysynnän selvittämisessä käytetään tietoja yhdysvaltalaisiin osakkeisiin sijoittavista rahastoista 
ja niiden osakeallokaatioista. Erityisesti tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää ylipainottavatko 
salkunhoitajat tyypillisesti korkean volatiliteetin osakkeita, vai yrittävätkö salkunhoitajat hyödyntää 
matalan volatilititeetin anomaliaa ylipainottaen matalan volatiliteetin osakkeita. 
 
AINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
 
Tutkimuksen aineistona on käytetty tietoja useasta eri lähteestä ja tiedot on kerätty WRDS-
tietokannasta. Tutkimusaineisto käsittää osakkeet, jotka ovat olleet listattuina yhdysvaltalaisissa 
pörsseissä (NYSE, AMEX ja NASDAQ) vuosina 1973-2013. Aineisto sisältää keskimäärin 4 266 
osaketta per kuukausi. Jokaisena kuukautena järjestän osakkeet kymmeneen desiiliin (1/10) 
historiallisen volatiliteetin mukaan, lasken desiilien tuotot ja tutkin volatiliteetin ja tuoton välistä 
suhdetta. Rahastoja koskeva aineisto käsittää yhdysvaltalaisten osakerahastojen omistukset vuosina 
2002-2013. Tutkin rahastoja, jotka ovat sijoittaneet 80%-100% nettovaroistaan Yhdysvalloissa 
listattuihin osakkeisiin. Tutkin rahastojen allokaatiota määrittämissäni volatiliteettiluokissa 
(volatiliteettidesiilit) ja vertaan allokaatioiden kokoa suhteessa markkinaportfolion jakaumaan 
määrittämissäni volatiliteettiluokissa. Tällä menetelmällä määritän mitä osakkeita salkunhoitajat 
keskimäärin yli- tai alipainottavat suhteessa markkinaportfolioon.  
 
TULOKSET 
 
Tulokset osoittavat, että matalan riskin osakkeet tarjoavat korkeampaa riskikorjattua tuottoa ja 
korkeampaa ylituottoa. Alimman volatiliteettidesiilin absoluuttinen tuotto on myöskin korkeampi 
kuin ylimmän volatiliteettidesiilin tuotto – tosin volatiliteetti ja absoluuttinen tuotto on pääasiassa 
positiivisesti korreloituneita pois lukien ylimpiin desiileihin kuuluvien osakkeiden tuotot. 
Keskimäärin rahastot hieman ylipainottavat korkean volatiliteetin osakkeita ja huomattavasti 
alipainottavat matalan volatiliteetin osakkeita. Salkunhoitajien keskimääräiset allokaatiot saattavat 
selittää, miksi matalan volatiliteetin anomalia on olemassa. 
 
Avainsanat  matalan volatiliteetin anomalia, riskin ja tuoton välinen suhde, rahastot, sijoitukset 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation of the study 
The expectation of positive reward for bearing risk is in the very core of finance. The positive 
relationship between risk and return was broadly accepted particularly due to the intuitive 
predictions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965)) about how to 
measure risk and the relationship between expected return and risk. Yet, already early research 
on the CAMP (Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972)) found that low risk assets provided returns 
that were too high relative to their risk, whereas high risk stocks provided relatively low returns. 
Recent academic papers (e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Baker and Haugen (2012) 
among many others) empirically show that low risk assets not only perform surprisingly well 
relative to their risk, but that low risk assets – either low volatility or low beta assets – actually 
outperform high risk assets within several different assets classes. The outperformance of low 
risk assets, or the so-called low risk anomaly, is observed primarily in terms of risk-adjusted 
returns and alphas but also in terms of absolute returns. The finding is significant because it has 
been observed both for beta and volatility within several asset classes and markets, and it 
ultimately contradicts with the core concept of finance. 
As intuitive as the positive risk-return relationship may seem, the empirical evidence is at least 
ambiguous, and even contrary in some cases. Ilmanen (2011) provides extensive evidence on 
the performance of different asset classes. He notes that the empirical relation between volatility 
and expected return is tenuous: “Volatility and long-term average returns are positively related 
across assets classes.” and “However, the most volatile assets within each asset class – high-
volatility stocks, 30-year Treasuries, and CCC-rated corporate – tend to offer low long-run 
returns and even worse risk-adjusted returns.” The similar conclusion was drawn by Haugen 
and Heins (1972). Their paper documents a negative relationship between risk and return in the 
U.S. stock market as well as in the U.S. bond market. However, they find that stocks as an asset 
class produced a much higher return than the bonds. They conclude that higher risk can be 
expected to produce a higher return across asset classes but not within an asset class. 
A vast amount of literature extends the evidence that higher risk is not well compensated within 
asset classes (e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), Baker and Haugen (2012), Baker, Bradley, and 
Wurgler (2010), Blitz and van Vliet (2007)). Also the early research on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) and its predictions (Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972)) noted that high 
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beta stocks experience lower absolute returns than suggested by the CAPM, whereas low beta 
stocks deliver higher absolute returns than the CAPM predicts. In other words, this means that 
the security market line which describes the relationship between risk and expected return was 
too flat relative to the CAPM. 
There are several explanations for the anomaly – many of them relating to biased investor 
behavior. Explanations include restrictions on borrowing, inefficient investment approaches, 
behavioral biases and manager compensation and other agency issues among a few more, all 
which hypothetically would result in an excess demand for stocks and other securities with 
higher risk. With regards to borrowing restrictions, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) propose that 
more leverage-constrained investors hold higher-beta securities than less constrained investors. 
They study equity portfolios of mutual funds and individual investors, both which are likely to 
have limited or no access to debt leverage, and find that these investors hold portfolios with 
average betas above 1, and therefore leverage by increasing beta risk of their portfolios. 
Furthermore, they find that less-constrained investors, namely leveraged buyout (LBO) funds 
and Berkshire Hathaway, acquire firms with average betas below 1 and apply leverage. Already 
in the 1970’s, Black (1972) developed a modification of the CAPM assuming restrictions on 
borrowing, contrary to the CAPM by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) that assumes 
unrestricted borrowing and lending of risky assets. The restricted model suggests that the return 
differences would be smaller across securities with different levels of systematic risk, and that 
lower risk securities have higher returns and higher risk securities lower returns relative to the 
original CAPM. 
Secondly, inefficient investment approaches have been proposed to explain the anomaly (e.g. 
Blitz and van Vliet (2007) and Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2010)). Because asset managers 
are compared against a market benchmark, assuming that the CAPM holds at least partially and 
risk-bearing results in positive expected returns, the asset managers have an incentive to tilt 
towards high beta or high volatility stocks (Blitz and van Vliet (2007)). Baker et al. (2010) also 
note that the fixed benchmarks, that are typically capitalization weighted, discourage investing 
in low risk stocks. Fixed benchmarks would therefore result in an excess demand for stocks 
with higher risk causing overpricing and reduced future expected returns. Furthermore, low risk 
stocks would experience the opposite effect. 
Thirdly, private investors are likely to be biased in many ways. Blitz and van Vliet (2007) argue 
that these investors become risk-neutral of even risk-seeking with regards to asset allocation 
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decision within a certain asset classes, opposite to risk-averse behavior with regards to asset 
allocation decision across asset classes. Baker et al. (2010) discuss that private investors have 
preference for lottery-like payoffs, and relate the bias to positive skewness in stocks returns, 
where large positive payoffs are more likely than large negative payoffs. Also Kumar (2009) 
finds that some individual clearly prefer stocks with lottery-like payoffs. Furthermore, many 
great investments, such as investing in Microsoft at its IPO, would have been speculative ones 
initially. Baker et al. (2010) argue that investors largely ignore the high rate at which these 
investments fail, and therefore, investors are willing to overpay for highly volatile and 
speculative stocks. Additionally, overconfidence of investors is proposed to explain high 
demand for high risk stocks (Baker et al. (2010)). 
Fourth, Baker and Haugen (2012) explain that mutual fund managers have an incentive to 
construct a more volatile portfolio rather than a less volatile, when they have possibility to earn 
a bonus based on their performance. They illustrate that a compensation scheme comprising a 
base salary and possible bonus is comparable to an option-like payoff, and thus, a portfolio’s 
volatility increases the expected value of the compensation creating an excess demand for high 
volatility stocks. Furthermore, analysts and portfolio managers want to show that they are able 
to select meritorious investments, and therefore, are attracted to stocks for which they can 
confidently make a compelling investment case. Baker and Haugen argue that these stocks often 
are noteworthy due to significant amount of news flow and media attention, making it easier 
for analysts and portfolio managers to confidently recommend and explain the cases to fellow 
colleagues and clients. However, the intense news coverage and broader analyst coverage is 
associated with higher volatility, Baker and Haugen finds. 
 
1.2 Definition of the research problem and contribution 
This thesis provides evidence on the low volatility anomaly and its causes from three 
perspectives: first, I examine the persistence of the anomaly in the U.S. over the past 40 years 
and during sub-sample periods by sorting stocks into deciles based on volatility. I analyze the 
performance of the ten deciles in terms of absolute excess returns, alphas and Sharpe ratios, and 
quantify how persistent the phenomenon has been, whether low volatility stocks outperform 
high volatility stocks in terms of risk-adjusted returns, alphas, or even in absolute return terms. 
Second, I investigate the persistence of the anomaly over a stock market cycle and study the 
performance of the volatility sorted portfolios both during declining and rising stock market. 
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Finally, I obtain a large set of U.S. mutual fund holdings and calculate the aggregate positions 
in each decile for each fund, and determine whether mutual fund managers actually overweight 
high volatility stocks and underweight low volatility stocks as suggested by several 
explanations for the anomaly. The most central research questions can be summarized in the 
following way: 
i) Is the low volatility anomaly persistent over time and is it a phenomenon that still 
exists? 
ii) Do low volatility stocks earn better returns than high volatility stocks only in risk-
adjusted terms or also in absolute terms? 
iii) Is low volatility anomaly associated with certain market conditions, particularly 
with either declining or rising general stock market, or is it persistent over the cycle? 
iv) Do portfolio managers overweight high volatility stocks and underweight low 
volatility stocks, and therefore contribute to the existence of the anomaly? 
Despite the fact that the relationship between risk and return has been subject of many research 
papers since the introduction of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965)), the topic continues to receive a vast amount of attention from both the academics and 
the industry practitioners. However, the underlying reason for the anomaly remains unclear. 
Particularly puzzling is the fact that the anomaly has not disappeared for example through 
trading by arbitrageurs, although several studies (e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker et al. 
(2010), Baker and Haugen (2012)) have suggested that the anomaly is due to some sort of 
market inefficiency or bias. 
The thesis contributes to the prior literature in several ways. The thesis confirms the results of 
previous studies and further clarifies whether low risk stocks have only higher risk-adjusted 
returns or also higher absolute returns than high risk stocks. Some studies focus on comparing 
the bottom and the top decile, and make conclusions based on the performance difference 
between these two. Therefore a reader may get an impression that both risk-adjusted and 
absolute returns are better for low risk stocks, although this might not be the case overall. The 
thesis expands the evidence on the persistence of the anomaly by looking at the returns in 
different market conditions. The anomaly is typically studied using fairly long sample periods 
that absorb the possible performance differences in volatility deciles between periods of upward 
trending and downward trending stock market. The information would be valuable for 
practitioners who are willing to exploit the anomaly. Furthermore, the thesis sheds light on 
5 
 
mutual fund portfolio managers’ investment allocations and studies whether the allocations are 
in line with the suggested explanations for the anomaly. For example, Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014) find that constrained investors hold portfolios with beta of above 1. However, they do 
not study the portfolios on security level, and therefore, it is unclear whether above 1 betas 
result from overweight in high beta securities or underweight in low beta securities, or both. 
This thesis expands the literature to cover security level analysis of mutual fund portfolios from 
the perspective of low volatility anomaly. 
 
1.3 Research scope and limitations of the study 
The thesis focuses on the U.S. common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
during the period from 1973 to 2013. Furthermore, the thesis defines risk as standard deviation 
of monthly returns, and no other risk measures or data frequencies are taken into account. Some 
of the previous studies use beta as the risk measure, for example Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). 
Additionally, researchers including Malkiel and Xu (2002) and Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 
(2006, 2009) have used idiosyncratic risk, or diversifiable risk, as the risk measure and study 
the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and future returns. However, studying the 
relationship between beta and expected returns as well as the relationship between idiosyncratic 
risk and future returns are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As for another limitation, the CRSP Mutual Funds Holdings database has an increasing amount 
of observations, and therefore the dataset may be more representative for more recent years. 
The mutual fund holdings data is available only starting from 2001 and extends through 2013. 
Moreover, the number of observations in 2001 is considerably low and these observations are 
not included in the sample. Mutual funds that are analyzed in this thesis are selected with a 
simple method by excluding funds that have less than 80% of net assets invested into equities. 
Therefore, mutual fund dataset is likely to include various mutual funds differing in terms of 
investment strategy, size, and other aspects. 
 
1.4 Main findings 
The findings suggest that investing in low risk stocks is particularly well rewarded both in terms 
of risk-adjusted returns and alphas. Furthermore, in terms of absolute excess returns, low risk 
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stock perform fairly well and the returns for low volatility stocks are better than the returns for 
stocks in the highest 10% volatility decile in most cases. However, the stocks in between the 
bottom 10% and top 10% volatility decile usually have higher absolute returns than the stocks 
in the bottom decile. 
Several explanations have been proposed for the anomaly, many of them suggesting that 
investors overweight risky securities and underweight low risk securities due to various reasons 
(see, e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2010), Baker and Haugen 
(2012), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)). The reasons resulting an incentive to tilt towards high 
risk stocks include restrictions on borrowing, use of market benchmarks, behavioral biases, 
fund managers’ compensation schemes and other agency issues. Indeed, I find that an average 
mutual fund has a moderate overweight in high volatility stocks and even more significant 
underweight in low volatility stocks compared to the market portfolio construction. Therefore, 
it seems that the mutual fund allocations and portfolio managers’ risk preferences contribute to 
the existence of the low volatility anomaly as there is an apparent excess demand for high 
volatility stocks and shortage of demand for low volatility stocks by the mutual funds. 
Moreover, both the underweight in low volatility stocks and the overweight in high volatility 
stocks have been persistent over the period from 2002 to 2013. I find that during this period 
low volatility stocks have clearly outperformed high volatility stocks in risk-adjusted return 
terms. Low volatility stocks have also had positive alphas, while high volatility stocks delivered 
roughly zero or no alpha. 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the relevant literature on the 
topic. The chapter highlights the central pieces of the theoretical framework of risk and 
expected return, empirical findings on the relationship between risk and return, the literature 
that focuses on the low risk anomaly, and the possible explanations for the anomaly. Chapter 3 
motivates and presents the hypotheses that are tested in this thesis. Chapter 4 present the data 
sources and describes the data samples that are used. Additionally, the Chapter 4 also presents 
the methodologies that are employed. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and discusses suggestions for further study. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I briefly recap the theoretical framework of the relationship between risk and 
return, namely the Capital Asset Pricing Model, as well as provide summary of empirical 
findings on the relationship between risk and return. Furthermore, I present a detailed overview 
of the literature on the low risk anomaly. Lastly, I discuss what could be the underlying reasons 
why the low risk anomaly exists. 
 
2.1 Theoretical relation between risk and return 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) is developed 
from the Markowitz (1959) portfolio theory and offers intuitive predictions about how to 
measure both risk and the relationship between expected return and risk. Under certain 
assumptions, the model predicts that the expected return on any asset would be 
𝐸(?̃?𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(?̃?𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓]   ( 1 ) 
where ?̃?𝑖 is the return on asset i for the period, 𝑅𝑓is the return on a risk-free asset for the period, 
?̃?𝑚 is the return on the market portfolio, and 𝛽𝑖 is the sensitivity of asset i to the market 
portfolio. The return on asset i equals the change in price of the asset, plus dividends, interest, 
and other distributions, divided by the price of the asset at the start of the period. The market 
sensitivity, or beta, of asset i is defined as follows 
𝛽𝑖 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑖,?̃?𝑚)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑚)
   ( 2 ) 
The underlying assumptions used in deriving the CAPM are as follows1: (a) All investors have 
a common joint probability distribution for all assets. They have homogenous beliefs about the 
mean, standard deviation and correlation for all assets. (b) The common probability distribution 
that describes the possible returns on the all assets is joint normal. (c) All investors only care 
about the mean and the variance of their portfolios and choose their portfolios to maximize their 
expected utility of wealth at the end of the period. Investors are risk averse, meaning that their 
                                                 
1 The portfolio theory by Markowitz (1959) already includes assumptions that investors are risk averse and they 
care only about the mean and the variance of their one-period investment return. The CAPM by Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) adds two key assumptions to the model. The first is the common agreement of joint distribution of 
asset returns and the second is that there is borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate. 
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utility function on their wealth at the end of the period increases at a decreasing rate as their 
wealth increases. (d) All investors can invest in any asset including the risk-free asset, and take 
a long or short position of any size in any asset. This includes the possibility that all investors 
may either borrow or lend any amount at the risk-free. (e) The markets are perfect and there are 
no transaction costs in investing in any of the assets. 
The assumptions behind the CAPM may not be true in reality however, although some of the 
assumptions can approximate reality well enough. Lintner (1969) shows that relaxing the 
assumption (a) does not have a significant effect on the structure of asset prices. Furthermore, 
assumptions (b) and (c) are generally regarded as acceptable approximations to reality (Black, 
1972). More problematic assumptions are (d) and (e). For many investors, especially the 
assumption that they can short any asset including borrowing at the risk-free rate is not true in 
reality. This reduces significantly their ability to adjust the market portfolio according to their 
risk preferences. Furthermore, in reality, there are transaction costs for buying and selling assets 
such as brokerage commissions, bid-ask spreads and taxes. 
The practical implementation of the CAPM may fail also for the reason that all securities are 
priced relative to the market portfolio, which in reality can include all assets and not just 
publicly traded securities. Thus, the implementation of the CAPM is sensitive to the market 
portfolio choice. Roll (1977) even states that the CAPM cannot be tested because we do not 
know the actual market portfolio. Therefore, the CAPM may not fail due to the misspecification 
of the model but due to wrong measurement of the market portfolio. 
Under the CAPM framework investors only pay for systematic risk, in other words, risk that is 
economy wide and correlated with the market. Non-systematic risk (also referred as 
idiosyncratic risk or diversifiable risk) will not be priced into security prices according to the 
CAPM framework because it can be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio. Due to the 
assumptions of the CAPM presented earlier, in theory, all investors end up holding a well-
diversified portfolio, which is the market portfolio that includes all assets and is the tangency 
portfolio on the mean-variance efficient frontier defined in the modern portfolio theory of 
Markowitz (1959). Figure 1 provides an illustrative presentation of the efficient frontier, the 
market portfolio and the tangency line of risk-free rate and the market portfolio, also called as 
the Capital Market Line. The market portfolio has the highest expected return per unit of risk, 
or Sharpe ratio, as described by the Capital Market Line. Although all investors may not have 
similar utility functions and therefore risk preferences, in theory all investors still end up 
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holding the market portfolio and a certain amount of the risk-free asset – either long or short 
position – so that the combination suits to one’s risk preferences. In other words, depending on 
an investor’s risk preferences, he/she would end up holding a combination of the market 
portfolio and the risk-free asset so that the combination is located somewhere on the Capital 
Market Line described in the Figure 1 and has the same expected Sharpe ratio as all the other 
combinations of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset. 
The Capital Asset Pricing model’s prediction about the relationship between beta risk and 
expected return is presented in the Figure 2. According to the framework, the relationship 
between risk and expected return is linear and higher risk is compensated with higher expected 
return. Furthermore, idiosyncratic risk is not priced and does not affect asset prices. In the 
following section, I cover the empirical findings of previous research on the CAPM framework 
and the relationship between expected return and risk. 
 
Figure 1: Capital Market Line and the efficient frontier 
Figure 1 provides an illustrative presentation of the theoretical Capital Market Line and the mean-
variance efficient frontier for risky assets. In theory, the market portfolio is located on the efficient 
frontier and the Capital Market Line is the tangency line of the risk-free rate and the market portfolio. 
The figure illustrates that the market portfolio is the best possible combination of risky assets for 
obtaining the highest expected return per unit of risk. 
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Figure 2: Security Market Line 
Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical linear relation between the expected return and beta. The market risk-
free rate has beta of zero and the market portfolio has beta of one. 
 
 
 
2.2 Empirical findings on the CAPM 
As briefly discussed in the previous section, many of the assumptions of the CAPM are not 
likely to hold in reality. Broad empirical evidence suggests that the CAPM fails to measure risk 
and predict the relationship between risk and expected return (see e.g. Black, Jensen, and 
Scholes (1972), Black (1993), Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2014), Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014)). The researchers typically find that the relationship between beta and expected returns 
is flatter than the theory predicts – some studies even report a negative relationship between the 
two. Fama and French (2004) note the empirical findings contradicting with the theory may be 
due to the simplifying assumptions of the CAPM or due to difficulties in implementing valid 
tests of the model. Further research on the relationship between risk and expected return 
documents that there is a fairly flat or even negative relationship also between volatility and 
future returns (Falkenstein (1994), Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang 
(2006, 2009), Baker and Haugen (2012)), and therefore the phenomenon is not limited only to 
beta and future returns but is a broader low risk anomaly. 
Early on after the CAPM was introduced, Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) found that the 
security market line that describes the relation between securities’ systematic risk and their 
expected returns, was too flat for U.S. stocks during the 35-year period from 1931 to 1965. In 
short, the result indicates that safer assets provided returns that were too high relative to the 
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CAPM, whereas riskier assets provided returns that were too low relative to their systematic 
risk. More recently, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show the relative flatness of the security 
market line for U.S. equities during the period from 1926 to 2012. Furthermore, they find that 
the security market line is not flatter than predicted by the CAPM only for U.S. equities, but 
also for equities in 18 of 19 international markets, in Treasury markets, for corporate bonds 
sorted by maturity and by rating, and in futures. Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2010) also 
conclude that their empirical results indicate that the relation between risk and return has not 
just flattened, but inverted. 
The fact that the empirical findings of the relationship between risk and return contradict with 
the theory may be traced back to possibly unrealistic assumptions of the CAPM. Black (1972) 
developed the CAPM by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) further and presented a model with 
restricted borrowing. The restricted model first assumes that there is no risk-free asset and that 
no riskless borrowing or lending is allowed. Secondly, it assumes that there is a risk-free asset 
but that only long positions in the risk-free asset are allowed. Both cases predict a linear relation 
between the expected return on a risky asset and the systematic risk of the risky asset. However, 
when there are restrictions on borrowing, the slope of the security market line is predicted to be 
smaller than without restrictions as in the standard CAPM. The empirical findings of Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) are more consistent with the 
CAPM with restricted borrowing, thereby indicating that the assumption of the original CAPM 
that all investors can invest in any asset including the risk-free asset, and take a long or short 
position of any size in any asset does not hold in reality. 
The standard CAPM also argues that only systematic, or market risk, should be incorporated 
into asset prices and non-systematic, or idiosyncratic risk, will not be priced into security prices 
because it can be eliminated through diversification by holding the market portfolio. However, 
Malkiel and Xu (2002) notes that also idiosyncratic risk may play a role in asset pricing, if some 
investors are unable to hold the market portfolio. Furthermore, if some investors fail to hold the 
market portfolio, also the remaining investors will not be able to hold the market portfolio. 
Therefore, an investor should not only be rewarded for market risk but also for idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Some early studies on the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and return (Lintner (1965), 
Douglas (1969)) already found that idiosyncratic risk may be priced. The early research finds 
that the relation between the two is either positive or statistically insignificant. For example, 
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Lintner (1965) finds a positive coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility in cross-sections. 
However, as Malkiel and Xu (2002) notes, the early empirical evidence that supported the role 
of idiosyncratic risk was disregarded after the study by Fama and MacBeth (1973) that rejected 
the role and provided a more powerful cross-sectional test. Later, Lehmann (1990) again found 
a statistically significant, positive coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility. The finding was 
supported with more recent study by Malkiel and Xu (2002), who found that idiosyncratic 
volatility is useful in explaining cross-sectional expected returns under both the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992) testing frameworks. Tinic and West (1986) and 
Malkiel and Xu (2002) also conclude that portfolios with higher idiosyncratic volatility earn 
higher average returns, yet without reporting any significance levels for their results. Later, Fu 
(2009) reported statistically significant and positive relationship between estimated conditional 
idiosyncratic volatilities and expected returns. 
Eventually, based on several recent studies, it seems that idiosyncratic risk may be priced in. 
However, there is an ongoing debate about whether idiosyncratic risk carries a positive or 
negative coefficient. Malkiel and Xu (2002) state an explicit role for idiosyncratic risk in pricing 
assets based on their results. They find that high idiosyncratic risk, measured by idiosyncratic 
volatility, is associated with high returns on average. Furthermore, their findings are robust for 
size and value effect as well as controlling for liquidity. Positive relationship was reported also 
by Fu (2009). Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006) present critique to the findings of Malkiel 
and Xu (2002), and state that they do not examine firm-level idiosyncratic volatility because 
they only use the idiosyncratic volatility of one of the 100 beta/size portfolios to which a stock 
belongs to proxy for the stock’s idiosyncratic risk. On contrary, Ang et al. (2006) find that 
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama and French (1993) model have 
“abysmally” low average returns. Later, Ang et al. (2009) present the same result that stocks 
with high idiosyncratic volatility have low average returns also in 23 developed markets, and 
not only in the U.S. markets. Lastly, Bali and Cakici (2008) have come up with a finding that 
again states that no robustly significant relationship exists between idiosyncratic volatility and 
expected returns. Additionally, he concludes that the negative relationship disappears, when 
small stocks are excluded from the sample. 
To summarize, the empirical findings on the CAPM suggest that the relationship between risk 
and expected return is definitely less positive than the CAPM predicts. The relative flatness of 
the Security Market Line is observed by many researchers possibly due to unrealistic 
assumptions of the CAPM. Issues such as restrictions on borrowing and that idiosyncratic risk 
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may be priced due to the fact that investors do not hold well-diversified portfolios are among 
the explanations why the framework fails. Furthermore, some studies state that the relationship 
is flat and no significant return differences exist between high and low risk assets, while at one 
extreme, some researchers propose an inverted relationship, whereby low risk stocks would 
have higher returns than high risks assets. Based on these studies, low risk stocks indeed seem 
to earn attractive returns outperforming high risk stocks in many occasions. In the following 
section, I elaborate the literature on the relationship between risk and return further by 
introducing more recent papers on the topic which also address several possible explanations 
for the anomalous relationship between risk and return. 
 
2.3 Literature on the low risk anomaly 
As the relationship between risk and return was found to be less positive than predicted, and 
further, as some studies even proposed a negative relationship, the recent research has 
concentrated on examining whether low risk stocks and other low risk assets actually 
outperform their riskier counterparts. Following a decent amount of evidence on the negative 
relationship, several papers have extended the research on this so called low risk anomaly and 
studied its persistence, its existence in numerous markets, and most importantly, its magnitude 
and the significance of the return differences. The low risk anomaly appears to be substantial 
in risk-adjusted terms, it has been persistent over decades and extends to several different 
markets and asset classes. The low risk anomaly also covers different risk measures, and both 
low beta and low volatility anomalies have been observed. Typically, the studies employ a 
methodology, whereby stocks are sorted based on their historical volatilities or betas, and then 
assigned into deciles (one-tenth), quintiles (one-fifth) or quartiles (one-fourth) in an ascending 
order. The returns for these portfolios are usually measured for the following month after the 
portfolio formation and the portfolios are assumed to be rebalanced every month. 
To start with, Blitz and van Vliet (2007) report a clear volatility effect that low risk stocks 
experience significantly higher risk-adjusted returns than the market portfolio. They also find 
that high risk stocks significantly underperform on a risk-adjusted basis. Furthermore, they find 
that the effect holds globally as well as within the U.S., European and Japanese markets in 
isolation, and it is robust for size, value, and momentum effects. The Sharpe ratios for low and 
high volatility stocks are 0.72 and 0.05 in the global results, respectively, and 0.58 and 0.10 in 
the U.S. results, respectively. Additionally, Blitz and van Vliet report alpha for portfolios 
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ranked on volatility and beta, although considerably less for beta ranked portfolios. The annual 
alpha spread between global low volatility decile and high volatility decile portfolios is reported 
to be 12% over the period from 1986 to 2006. Later Blitz, Pang, and van Vliet (2012) study 
returns in emerging markets and the results are consistent with the findings for developed equity 
markets. Blitz et al. find a flat or even negative relationship between volatility and returns. They 
also report Sharpe ratios that are clearly higher for low volatility stocks than for high volatility 
stocks.  
Similarly, Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2010) find that low volatility and low beta portfolios 
have earned higher average absolute returns and also experienced smaller drawdowns than high 
volatility and high beta portfolios. Baker et al. focus on value-weighted portfolios and study 
both volatility and beta sorted portfolios in a full-sample of U.S. stocks as well as in a sample 
where only top 1000 stocks based on market capitalization are included. The annualized return 
spread is clearly positive between the lowest risk and highest risk quintiles (low risk minus high 
risk) ranging from 2.7% to 6.9% in all the samples except in the volatility sorted sample 
comprising top 1000 stocks based on market capitalization, for which the return spread is 
negative. The strongest low risk effect is observed in volatility sorted portfolios comprising the 
full sample without any market cap limitations. In addition, Baker et al. also emphasize two 
aspects that make the low risk portfolios look even more attractive than the high risk portfolios. 
Firstly, they find that the low risk portfolios’ paths to their higher dollar values have been much 
smoother, and thus, they have had genuinely lower risk. Secondly, the high risk portfolios have 
higher transaction costs of monthly rebalancing which means that the reported outperformance 
of low volatility and low beta portfolios is understated. The finding of Baker et al. that low 
volatility and low beta portfolios have earned higher absolute returns indicates that the security 
market line could actually be inverted during their sample period from 1968 through 2008. Yet, 
also the findings in this thesis show that period from 1974 to 2013 was very good period in 
absolute return wise for low volatility stocks compared to high volatility stocks, and especially 
in value-weighted portfolios. Therefore, it is crucial to have a look on results in other studies 
that are based on different sample periods and preferably supported with findings in other equity 
markets.  
Baker and Haugen (2012) extend research of Baker et al. (2010) to cover several additional 
equity markets outside the U.S. They study stock markets in 21 developed countries and in 12 
emerging markets over the period from 1990 to 2011. The paper supports the evidence that 
greater risk cannot be expected to produce a greater reward but rather bearing relative risk in 
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the equity markets yields an expected negative return in all developed countries and emerging 
markets. They calculate the volatility of total return for each company over the previous 24 
months and rank the stocks by volatility into deciles, quintiles, and halves in each country. Their 
sample includes non-survivors and the sample consists of 99.5% of the capitalization in each 
country. The results in Baker and Haugen’s paper indicate that the low volatility effect is not 
limited to only to the U.S. equity market but is a rather global phenomenon. Both in developed 
countries and emerging markets low volatility stocks show significant outperformance over 
high volatility stocks: in addition to 10% to 25% reduction in portfolio volatility, the absolute 
returns are clearly higher for the lowest volatility decile compared to the highest volatility 
decile. As a result, the Sharpe ratio differences between low and high volatility stocks across 
countries are dramatic and clearly in favor of low volatility stocks. Baker and Haugen 
summarize that there are times when high volatility outperforms, but they are “few and far 
between”.  
Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013) decompose the low beta anomaly into micro and macro 
components in an attempt to find out more precisely what drives the anomaly. With regards to 
micro component they mean the selection of low beta stocks, while macro component refers to 
either low beta country or industry selection. They find that actually both the micro-level stock 
selection and macro-level industry and country selection contribute to the low beta anomaly. 
Interestingly, they state that micro selection of low beta stocks leads to a significant reduction 
in risk with only a modest difference in return. Therefore, micro selection presents an 
opportunity to form lower risk portfolios that do not suffer lower returns. Secondly, macro 
selection of low beta industries or countries has little impact on risk but leads increases in return. 
Baker et al.’s point out that countries that are identified high risk ex ante have distinctly lower 
future returns. 
Recent paper by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) studies betting-against-beta factor, which is long 
leveraged low-beta assets and short high-beta assets, and finds that the factor produces 
significant positive risk-adjusted returns. They also find that high beta is associated with low 
alpha within U.S. equities and in 20 international equity markets but also within Treasury 
bonds, corporate bonds, and futures. In each asset class, alphas and Sharpe ratios are almost 
monotonically declining in beta. This indicates an additional evidence that the relative flatness 
of the security market line is not isolated to the U.S. stock market but that it is a global 
phenomenon and exists across various asset classes. Their findings are also robust for market, 
value, size, momentum, and liquidity factors.  
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The results presented in the literature for both the low volatility anomaly and low beta anomaly 
are clearly inconsistent with theoretical models of risk and return such as the CAPM, which 
predicts a positive risk-return relationship. Interesting question is whether the anomalous 
relationship can be attributed to market mispricing or to compensation for higher systematic 
risk. Examination by Li, Sullivan, and Cargia-Feijoo (2013) suggests that the anomalous returns 
are more likely attributable to market mispricing rather than to compensation for some hidden 
risk factor. Furthermore, the mispricing seems to be connected to volatility as a stock 
characteristic, i.e. investors appear to have some particular preference for high volatility stocks 
over low volatility stocks. 
In summary, several studies report attractive returns for low risk stocks and also for other low 
risk securities. However, not so much critique has been presented to these results. In their more 
recent study, Li, Sullivan, and Cargia-Feijoo (2014) are among the few to present some counter 
arguments to the low volatility anomaly. They state that the existence and effectiveness of the 
anomaly are more limited than widely believed. Although their findings suggest that the returns 
are anomalous over the following month of portfolio formation, they find that holding low 
volatility stocks beyond the first month produces little or no alpha, and therefore exploiting the 
anomaly requires frequent trading which diminishes the returns significantly due to transaction 
costs. Additionally, they find that the low risk effect is completely eliminated for equal-
weighted portfolios within a sample where stocks with price less than $5 are excluded. 
However, Li, Sullivan, and Cargia-Feijoo (2014) study the effect for idiosyncratic volatility 
similar to Ang et al. (2006 and 2009), and as earlier discussed, the evidence on the relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns is mixed. Therefore, far-reaching 
conclusions should not be made before similar results are reported for simple volatility and 
beta. For now, broad evidence suggest that low volatility and low beta stocks outperform high 
volatility and high beta stocks and the results are robust to various factors such as value, size, 
momentum and liquidity. The follow section presents the possible explanations for the anomaly 
from previous studies. 
 
2.4 Explanations for the low risk anomaly 
The low risk anomaly is puzzling because investing in low volatility and low beta assets has 
provided attractive returns across asset classes, the result can be observed in long samples, and 
the phenomenon has become stronger in more recent sample periods. Furthermore, the 
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phenomenon cannot be explained by any other anomaly and the result is significant after 
controlling for size, value, momentum and liquidity effects. Blitz, Falkenstein, and van Vliet 
(2013) provide an excellent summary of various explanations that have been proposed in the 
previous literature. These include for example leverage constraints, constraints on short-selling, 
use of pre-specified benchmark indexes, agency issues, preference for skewness and 
representativeness bias among other explanations. In the following, I describe the proposed 
explanations in detail. 
 
2.4.1 Restrictions on borrowing 
Already in the 1970s, the CAPM assumptions and the prediction of linear relationship between 
the systematic risk of a risky asset and the expected return on the risky assets were challenged. 
Black (1972) developed a model that assumed restrictions on borrowing, contrary to the CAPM 
that assumes unrestricted borrowing and lending of risky assets. The result of his model was 
that, when there are restrictions on borrowing, the slope of the security market line – the 
relationship between beta and expected return – is smaller than what the CAPM suggests. 
Therefore, the CAPM with restricted borrowing suggests that the return differences are smaller 
across assets with different levels of systematic risk. However, the level of systematic risk for 
different assets is still the same, although the differences in expected returns are suggested to 
be smaller. With respect to risk-adjusted returns, the CAPM with restricted borrowing makes 
assets with lower risk to look more attractive as flatter security market line means that more 
risky assets have lower Sharpe ratios or less risky assets have higher Sharpe ratios, or both, 
compared to predictions of the traditional CAPM. As a result, borrowing or leverage restrictions 
can be a plausible explanation why low risk assets perform so much better, particularly in risk-
adjusted terms, and therefore an explanation for the low risk anomaly. Leverage restrictions 
have been noted as an explanation for the low risk anomaly also in more recent research, namely 
by Blitz and van Vliet (2007) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). Frazzini and Pedersen discuss 
that borrowing restrictions cause investors to leverage by overweighting risky assets, and thus, 
bidding the prices of risky assets up resulting in lower expected return. They also find that high 
beta is associated with low alpha, and the finding applies to U.S. equities, 20 international 
equity markets, Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and futures. 
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2.4.2 Inefficient investment approach 
Second potential explanation for the low risk anomaly could be inefficient decentralized 
investment approach that is often used in the investment industry, argue Blitz and van Vliet 
(2007). The authors refer to a process where a CIO or an investment committee first makes the 
asset allocation decision followed by capital allocation to managers who buy securities within 
different asset classes. Binsbergen et al. (2008) argue that this kind of investment approach 
cause uncertainty for the CIO about the managers’ risk appetites increasing the costs of 
decentralized investment management and the value of an optimally designed benchmark. The 
problem with the approach is that the asset managers are usually compared against a market 
benchmark, and as a result, the managers have an incentive to tilt towards high beta or high 
volatility stocks because it is a way to generate above average returns, if the CAPM holds at 
least partially (Blitz and van Vliet (2007)). Tilting towards high risk stocks may cause these 
stocks to become overpriced reducing the expected future return for these stocks, whereas low 
risk stocks may become underpriced together with improved expected future return. Also Baker 
et al. (2010) note that many institutional investors have fixed benchmark mandates, typically 
capitalization weighted, which discourage investing in low risk stocks. They state that it is 
unlikely that asset managers would exploit this mispricing because the low risk strategy 
involves holding assets with more or less similar long-term returns, thus resulting in no 
improvement in excess returns, but with different risks, which increases tracking error, and as 
a result, decreases information ratio, a measure of an asset manager’s performance. 
Furthermore, they emphasize that the low risk anomaly will likely persist due to the ever-
increasing importance of institutional investors with fixed benchmarks. 
 
2.4.3 Behavioral biases of investors 
Thirdly, the low risk anomaly can be explained by behavioral biases of private investors. Blitz 
and van Vliet (2007) discuss about behavioral portfolio theory that describes private investors 
thinking in terms of a two-layer portfolio, where the first layer is the asset allocation decision 
and the second is the allocation decision with a certain asset class.  Shefrin and Statman (2000) 
call the first layer as a low aspiration layer which is designed to avoid poverty, whereas the 
second layer is called a high aspiration layer designed for a road to riches. Blitz and van Vliet 
suppose that private investors are rational risk-averse investors with regards to the asset 
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allocation decision but become risk-neutral or even risk-seeking with regards to the allocation 
decision within a certain asset class. If this is the case, investors are willing to overpay for risky 
stocks which are perceived to be similar to lottery tickets. Furthermore, diversification within 
an asset class destroys upside potential, while buying a few volatile stocks leaves upside 
potential intact. This is consistent with the finding that most private investors only hold about 
one to five stocks in their portfolio. Blitz and van Vliet argue that deviations from risk-averse 
behavior may cause high-risk stocks to be overpriced and low-risk stocks to be underpriced. 
Also Baker et al. (2010) identify the behavioral biases of private investors as an explanation for 
the low risk anomaly. The irrationality biases they list include preference for lotteries, 
representativeness and overconfidence biases. With regards to the preference for lotteries, they 
note that the bias is more about positive skewness in stock returns, where large positive payoffs 
are more likely than large negative payoffs, than it is about volatility. Kumar (2009) also finds 
that some individual investors show clear preference for stocks with lottery-like payoffs. 
The representativeness bias is related to the characteristics of “great investments”. For example, 
buying Microsoft at its IPO in 1986 would have been a great investment, yet a speculatively 
one. Therefore, an investor – if not the most sophisticated one – may conclude that the road to 
riches is paved with speculative investments. Here, an investor would however largely ignore 
the high rate at which speculative investments fail, and thus, is willing to overpay for risky 
stocks (Baker et al. (2010)). 
The third behavioral bias causing the preference for high volatility stocks is overconfidence 
(Baker et al. (2010)). Experimental evidence shows that most people form too narrow 
confidence interval, or in other words, are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgment. 
Valuing stocks also includes making judgment about the future, for example estimating 
revenues. Baker et al. write that overconfident investors are likely to disagree about the future 
estimates. In addition, they are likely to agree to disagree, and therefore stick with the false 
precision of his or her estimate. The higher the uncertainty of the outcome the higher is the 
extent of disagreement. Thus, volatile stocks will elicit a wider range of opinions. There is one 
additional assumption needed to connect overconfidence to the demand for high risk stocks: 
pessimists must act less aggressively in markets than optimists. Already, the empirically evident 
scarcity of short sales among individual investors and even institutional investors compared 
long positions limits the actions of pessimists and allows optimists to act more aggressively. 
Miller (1977) finds that prices are generally set by optimists, and therefore stocks with a wider 
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range of opinions will have more optimists as shareholders and sell for higher prices resulting 
in lower expected future returns. 
 
2.4.4 Manager compensation and agency issues 
Fourth explanation for the low volatility anomaly provided in the previous literature relates to 
portfolio managers’ compensation and agency issues (Baker and Haugen (2012)). The agency 
issues are noted to exist both between professional investment managers within an organization 
and also between these professionals and their clients. 
Firstly, Baker and Haugen (2012) explains that the nature of portfolio manager compensation 
has an influence on how volatile portfolio is constructed by the portfolio manager. Typically, a 
manager’s compensations consists of a base salary and an additional bonus when the portfolio’s 
performance is sufficiently high. This sort of a compensation schedule is described in the Figure 
3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Option-like portfolio manager compensation 
Figure 3 describes Baker and Haugen’s (2012) illustration of a manager compensation schedule whereby 
the manager is paid a base salary and then a bonus when performance is sufficiently high. The figure 
also includes two probability distributions: one for a portfolio with high volatility and the other for a 
portfolio with lower volatility. 
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The figure 3 also presents two probability distributions describing the probabilities of different 
performance levels for a low volatility and a high volatility portfolios. Assuming that a manager 
aims to maximize the expected value of his/her compensation, and that there are no immediate 
downside risks for the manager him-/herself (such as termination of employment etc.), he/she 
is likely to build a more volatile, rather than a less volatile portfolio. Due to the fact that a 
typical compensation schedule has an option-like payoff, the higher the portfolio’s volatility is, 
the higher is the expected value of manager’s compensation. This sort of compensation 
mechanism should therefore result in an increased demand for stocks with higher volatility. 
Similar conclusion was drawn by Falkenstein (1994) and Karceski (2002) that asymmetric 
payoff creates an incentive for mutual fund managers to tilt their portfolios toward high 
volatility and high beta stocks. Karceski develops an agency model that first hypothesizes that 
mutual fund investors chase returns through time and that the cash inflows to mutual funds are 
unusually large just after strong market runups. Secondly, Karceski’s model assumes that 
mutual fund investors chase returns cross-sectionally across funds so that the best-performing 
funds capture the largest share of aggregate inflows into mutual funds. Indeed, Karceski shows 
empirically that the market returns have a large economic impact on the subsequent aggregate 
cash flows into mutual funds. Furthermore, Sirri, and Tufano (1998) report that net cash inflows 
into mutual funds are relatively insensitive to fund performance, except for the best performing 
funds. Karceski’s model further hypothesizes that these two performance-fund flow 
relationships create an asymmetry in the payoffs for mutual fund managers, whereby fund 
managers mostly care about outperforming peers during bull markets. Since high beta stocks 
tend to outperform during rising markets, active fund managers have an incentive to overweight 
high beta stocks, decreasing the expected future returns for these stocks. Additionally, 
Falkenstein (1994) reports that open-ended mutual funds clearly prefer stocks that are liquid, 
well-known, and highly volatile. 
In addition to the issues related to fund manager compensation and the performance-fund flow 
relationships, Baker and Haugen (2012) highlight that there is a significant agency issue also 
amongst the portfolio managers themselves that creates excess demand for more volatile stocks. 
They describe that a typical investment process includes periodic investment committee 
meetings that are part of the process of building a model portfolio guiding the construction of 
individual portfolios for clients. During these meetings, a team of analysts, each with a specific 
focus area, are typically asked to make a case for stocks they think should be included in the 
model portfolio. Baker and Haugen describe that the analysts have a natural need to impress 
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the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) and their fellow analysts with their ability to select 
meritorious investments. As a result, the analysts are attracted to stocks for which they can 
confidently make a compelling case. These stocks tend to be noteworthy and typically receive 
notable media attention. However, because of the noteworthiness of these compelling and 
attractive cases, the related flow of new information is fairly intense resulting in higher than 
average volatility. As a result, Baker and Haugen expect that based on the analysts’ desire to 
impress their colleagues, stocks with higher than average volatility would be likely to be 
included in the model portfolio. Furthermore, Baker and Haugen argue that the interesting 
nature of these stocks help the professional money managers to explain changes in the model 
portfolio to their clients. In summary, they hypothesize that these agency issues create excess 
demand for highly volatile stocks by both professional investors and their clients. 
Baker and Haugen study roughly the largest 1,000 stocks in the United States over the period 
from 2000 through 2009. They look at the percentage of a stock’s total market capitalization 
held by institutional investors and conclude that institutional investors as a group do indeed 
have a higher ownership share in more volatile stocks. The result applies for all of the ten size 
deciles based on market capitalization expect for the very smallest stocks (smallest 10% of 
stocks). Moreover, they empirically find that more volatile stocks do indeed have both a 
significantly greater analyst coverage and a more intense new coverage. Consequently, Baker 
and Haugen conclude that these findings support their hypotheses that both the typical portfolio 
manager compensation where sufficiently high performance is rewarded with bonus and the 
agency issues are responsible for creating excess demand for volatile stocks resulting in their 
over-pricing and production of poor returns in the future.  
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3. HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Introduction to hypotheses 
This section describes the hypotheses of the study. The first hypothesis addresses the existence 
and persistence of the low volatility anomaly over the past 40 years. In addition to hypothesizing 
a strong low volatility anomaly over the 40-year period from 1974 to 2013, I expect that the 
anomaly has been a persistent phenomenon also during shorter sample periods, particularly 
over the four 10-year sub-sample periods. 
The second and third hypotheses are related to whether low volatility stocks actually earn higher 
absolute returns than high volatility stocks, or whether the low volatility anomaly exists only in 
risk-adjusted return basis. Following the confirmation of the existence and persistence of the 
low volatility anomaly and clarifying the significance of it, I shed new light on the topic by 
studying the anomaly over periods both when the stock market is rising and when the market is 
declining. The fourth hypothesis addresses the question whether the low volatility anomaly is 
driven by either declining or rising market conditions, or does the anomaly persist over stock 
market cycles. 
The fifth hypothesis relates to the holdings of mutual funds and whether the mutual fund 
portfolio managers invest in low volatility stocks and harvest the presumably attractive returns 
given by low volatility stocks. The fifth hypothesis has theoretically and empirically 
contradicting background: As the low volatility anomaly has been recognized since the early 
research of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), one could expect that sophisticated investors 
such as mutual fund managers would be exploiting the anomaly by investing in low volatility 
stocks – or at least not investing against the phenomenon by underweighting low volatility 
stocks. On the other hand, there is a question why any mutual fund manager would want to 
invest excessively in low risk stocks given the intuitive prediction of the CAPM that higher 
returns result from taking additional risk, not the other way round. The fifth hypothesis takes a 
view on this contradictory issue. 
 
3.2 Risk and return relationship 
The first three hypotheses are associated with the basic premise of the capital asset pricing 
theory that risk and return should be correlated (Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)). If assets 
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are priced correctly, then the expected return for one asset would be higher compared to the 
expected return of another asset only if the former asset has higher risk than the latter one. 
However, previous studies have shown that stocks with lower risk have earned better risk-
adjusted returns (e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), Blitz and van Vliet (2007)) and better 
absolute returns (e.g. Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2010), Baker and Haugen (2012)) than 
stocks with higher risk. Studying the period from 1926 to 2012, Frazzini and Pedersen have 
also shown that high risk is associated with low alpha and that alphas and Sharpe ratios are 
almost monotonically declining in risk within several separate asset classes.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) was introduced 
in the 1960’s with predictions of the mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio and the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis assuming informationally efficient markets. However, already 
early research on the CAPM notes that the security market line, which describes the relation 
between securities’ expected returns and their systematic risk, was too flat for U.S. stocks 
(Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972)) – safer assets provided returns that were too high relative 
to the CAPM, whereas riskier assets provided returns that were too low relative to their 
systematic risk. More recently, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) showed the relative flatness of the 
security market line for U.S. equities during the period from 1926 to 2012. 
Many explanations for the phenomenon have been provided including restrictions on borrowing 
and leveraging through overweighting riskier assets (Black (1972), Blitz and van Vliet (2007), 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)), the use of market benchmarks creating an incentive to tilt 
towards high beta and high volatility stocks (Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker et al. (2010)), 
behavioral biases resulting in deviations from risk-averse behavior that causes investors to 
overpay for risky stocks which are perceived similar to lottery tickets (Blitz and van Vliet 
(2007), Baker et al. (2010)), and portfolio manager compensation together with agency issues 
that create excess demand for stocks with above average volatility (Baker and Haugen (2012)). 
All the previous hypotheses are supported with empirical evidence, although it remains unclear 
which of them has the greatest impact on the existence of the low volatility anomaly.  
Assuming that these issues have been persistent and significant since the introduction of the 
CAPM in the 1960’s and for most of the time during the period from 1974 to 2013, my first 
hypothesis is the following:  
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H1. Low volatility anomaly has been a persistent phenomenon over the past 40 years 
and during the four 10-year sub-sample periods. 
 
In order to test the first hypothesis, all the stocks in the main U.S. stocks exchanges are sorted 
based on their past volatility into ten deciles. I calculate both equally weighted and value-
weighted returns for the portfolios. I also calculate alphas against different market models and 
Sharpe ratios for each decile.  
Despite the general statement that low risk stocks have outperformed high risk stocks, not all 
studies report that this conclusion holds in absolute return terms in addition to risk-adjusted 
return terms. For example, based on the research by both Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and 
Blitz and van Vliet (2007), the low volatility anomaly seems to be a matter of low risk stocks 
outperforming high risk stocks only in risk-adjusted terms, whereas Baker, Bradley, and 
Wurgler (2010) and Baker and Haugen (2012) find low volatility anomaly in absolute returns.  
Empirically it seems to be the case that risk-adjusted returns for low risk stocks are consistently 
higher than the risk-adjusted returns for high risk stocks. However, only a few studies report 
that also absolute returns would be higher for low risk stocks compared to high risks stocks. 
Additionally, most studies focus on comparing the performance of the lowest volatility (or beta) 
decile to the performance of the highest volatility decile, while for example Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2014) report increasing absolute returns when moving from the lowest volatility 
decile up to 6th decile. They also report higher absolute returns for the 7th, 8th, 9th and the 10th 
deciles compared to the lowest volatility decile. However, in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), the 
return differences are fairly small (monthly returns range from 0.91% to 1.10%) compared to 
the alpha differences (monthly alpha spread ranges from 0.37% to 0.89% between low beta and 
high beta) and volatility differences (high beta decile has annual volatility of 41.7% compared 
to 15.7% for the lowest beta decile). I expect that the low volatility anomaly in risk-adjusted 
returns is primarily driven by large differences in volatilities, while the differences in absolute 
returns actually mitigate the anomaly. Following this, my second and third hypotheses are as 
follows: 
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H2.  Low volatility anomaly is a persistent phenomenon primarily in risk-adjusted 
terms, and it is driven by large differences in volatilities and small differences 
in absolute returns. 
 
H3. There is not a clear and consistent low volatility anomaly observable in absolute 
return terms. 
 
In order to test the second and third hypotheses, I follow similar methodology as for testing the 
first hypothesis. Again, all the stocks in the main U.S. stocks exchanges are sorted based on 
their past volatility into ten deciles. I calculate both equally weighted and value-weighted 
returns for the portfolios. I also calculate alphas against different market models – the simple 
market model, Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor model and Pastor-
Stambaugh five-factor model – and Sharpe ratios for each decile.  
 
3.3 Association with market conditions 
The low volatility anomaly is typically studied using long samples and fairly long sub-sample 
periods, where timeframes range from 20 years up to some 80 years. Therefore, one of the 
contributions of this paper is to study whether the low volatility anomaly is driven by periods 
when the stock market is either rising or declining, or is it a persistent phenomenon over the 
stock market cycle. 
The fourth hypothesis is therefore associated with the movements of the general stock market 
portfolio. Blitz and van Vliet (2007) finds that the low risk portfolios underperform the market 
during up market months, while outperforming the market during down market months. 
Furthermore, they find that the underperformance during up months is considerably smaller 
than the outperformance during down months. Yet, this effect is countered to some extent by 
more frequent occurrence of up months, 59% of up months versus 41% of down months in their 
sample. Based on their findings, my fourth hypothesis is the following: 
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H4.  Low volatility anomaly is not a persistent phenomenon over the stock market 
cycle and it is primarily observable when the stock market is declining. When 
the stock market is rising, low volatility anomaly becomes weaker, or even non-
existent. 
 
For testing the fourth hypothesis, I use similar methodology as for testing the first hypothesis, 
but instead of using the whole sample period or arbitrarily selected sub-sample periods, I 
classify the month-observations into five separate data sets based on the trend in the market 
index. I study the data between 1994 and 2013, and select five separate sample periods that are 
determined as follows: the period starting from January 1994 and ending in March 2000, when 
the stock market peaks, the second periods starts from the market peak experienced in March 
2000 and ends in September 2002, when the stock market bottoms, and so on. As a result, I end 
up studying three separate periods of rising stocks market and two separate periods of declining 
stock market during the past 20 years. 
 
3.4 Mutual fund holdings 
The main contribution of this paper is to study how mutual fund managers invest relative to the 
composition of a benchmark index – in this case, relative to the CRSP value-weighted market 
index. In particular, I study mutual fund holdings – focusing on funds that mainly invest in the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed stocks – in the ten deciles that are created by sorting stocks 
in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ based on their historical volatility, and then comparing a 
mutual fund’s aggregate exposure to a particular decile to that decile’s weight in the market 
portfolio. As a result, it can be determined whether mutual funds generally overweight or 
underweight stocks that have either low or high volatility. 
One of the hypothesized causes for the low volatility anomaly is the use of benchmark indices 
in the fund management industry. Therefore, to understand the anomaly more thoroughly, it is 
useful to study how mutual fund managers invest relative to the benchmark. The theory that the 
use of benchmark indices drives the excess demand for stocks with higher risk proposes that, 
in an attempt to beat a benchmark index, mutual fund managers overweight the stocks with 
higher risk and underweight the stocks with lower risk due to an expectation that the CAPM 
holds well enough. However, a broad literature has already noted that the CAPM does not hold 
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well in reality (see e.g. Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Black (1993), Blitz and van Vliet 
(2007), Baker and Haugen (2012), Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2014), Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014)). Despite this, the financial industry relies on the CAPM framework to some extent, 
which gives a reason to believe that fund managers’ portfolios can also be influenced by the 
CAPM’s proposition of risk and return. 
Second explanation for the low volatility anomaly that relates to mutual fund portfolio 
composition is the notion of portfolio manager compensation and agency issues by Baker and 
Haugen (2012). Firstly, they argue that a typical compensation schedule of base salary added 
with possible bonus, when the performance is sufficiently high, can be seen as an option-like 
payoff mechanism resulting in an incentive for a portfolio manager to increase the volatility of 
his/her portfolio because the portfolio volatility increases the expected value of his/her 
compensation. This would then result in an excess demand for the stocks with higher volatility. 
Furthermore, additional agency issues emerge in the process of building a model portfolio that 
guides the construction of individual portfolios for the clients of an asset manager. In short, 
during the process, analysts are asked to make a case for stocks they believe should be included 
in the model portfolio. To be able to impress colleagues and enhance their own career 
advancement possibilities, analysts tend to be attracted to noteworthy stocks for which they can 
confidently make a compelling case. However, these noteworthy stocks tend to be volatile ones 
due to both significant analyst coverage and intense news coverage. Moreover, it is easier for 
portfolio managers to explain the changes in the model portfolio to their clients, when a stock 
is interesting and receives attention from both analysts and media. Baker and Haugen (2012) 
argues that these agency issues create excess demand for stocks with above average volatility, 
in addition to manager compensation issues. 
Based on the explanations related to benchmarking and portfolio manager compensation and 
agency issues, my fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5.  Mutual fund managers overweight the stocks with higher volatility, and 
conversely, underweight the stocks with lower volatility.  
 
In order to test this hypothesis, I have obtained mutual fund holdings data from the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database. I study the portfolios with majority of their investments made into the 
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NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed equities. In particular, I focus on the portfolios with at 
least 80% of a portfolio’s total net assets invested into U.S. listed common stocks. I exclude 
levered portfolios for which over 100% of a portfolio’s total net assets has been invested into 
equities. Each month, I classify every common stock in each mutual fund portfolio to one of 
the ten volatility deciles defined based on the historical volatilities of individual stocks in the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Next, I calculate the percentage of each mutual fund’s total net 
assets by volatility decile in each observation month and determine monthly decile exposures 
for the mutual funds. I also calculate similar monthly decile exposures for the market portfolio, 
i.e. for the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. Following these, I compare the monthly 
decile exposures in each mutual fund to the decile exposures of the market portfolio and 
compute mutual funds’ relative positions – whether overweight or underweight - in each decile 
compared to the market portfolio. Consequently, I obtain results that provide evidence whether 
mutual fund portfolio managers overweight high volatility stocks and underweight low 
volatility stocks relative to the market portfolio. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the data used in the empirical part of the study. There are several data sets 
and data sources used in the study. Data comprises monthly stock returns, delisting returns for 
non-survivors, trading volumes, closing prices, market capitalizations, market portfolio returns, 
monthly risk-free rates and other market factors including Fama-French factors, Carhart’s 
momentum factor, Pastor-Stambaugh traded liquidity factor. All data is at monthly frequency. 
In addition, with regards to U.S. mutual fund holdings, I have obtained data of portfolio 
constituents and constituents’ share of a portfolio’s total net assets. 
The data are collected from the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) and the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database, both in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) database at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Fama-French factors, market excess return, 
risk-free interest rate (one month Treasury Bill rate), and momentum factors are originally from 
Kenneth French’s website at Darthmouth, though also obtained from the WRDS. Pastor-
Stambaugh traded liquidity factors are obtained from the WRDS.  
In addition to the data description, this chapter describes the methodology used in the study. 
The description of the methodology includes calculation methodology of stock volatilities and 
construction of volatility ranked portfolios, and estimation of alphas controlled for the market, 
size, value, momentum and liquidity. In addition, I describe the methodology used to determine 
mutual funds’ relative exposures to volatility deciles. 
 
4.1 Stock return data 
The stock return data comprises ordinary common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) traded 
on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (CRSP exchange codes 1, 2 and 3) during the period from 
January 1973 to November 2013. I exclude ADR’s, REIT’s, financials, closed-end funds, 
foreign shares, and stocks with no trading volume during a month. I calculate historical 
volatilities using the monthly returns over the past 12, 36 and 60 months.  The dataset that is 
used to calculate 12-month historical volatilities begins from January 1973, whereas datasets 
that are used to calculate 36-month and 60-month volatilities begin from January 1971 and 
January 1969, respectively. The return observation period for all the three datasets is from 
January 1974 to November 2013. 
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The sample using 12-month volatility as the measure of risk consists of 4,266 companies on 
average in each month. The lowest number of company-observations, 1,995 in total, is observed 
in December 1976, while the highest number of company-observations, 6,594 in total, is 
observed in November 1997. The dataset beginning from January 1974 and ending in 
November 2013 has 479 month-observations. 
In this study, I use monthly stock return data. Monthly excess returns over the risk-free rate are 
used for calculating portfolio returns and stock volatilities. The return data for the general 
market index is also obtained from the CRSP at monthly frequency. The used market index is 
the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio that excludes ADR’s. The CRSP value-weighted 
market portfolio takes dividends and other distributions into account. The market portfolio 
excess return data is used for comparison of the performance between the market and the decile 
portfolios. The risk-free rate is originally from Kenneth French’s website, though also obtained 
from the WRDS. The risk-free rate is at monthly frequency and is the one month U.S. Treasury 
Bill rate. 
 
4.2 Fama-French factors and other market factors 
I use the basic Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)), Fama-French 
three-factor model (Fama and French (1993)), Carhart four-factor model (Carhart (1997)) and 
five-factor model (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)), which is the four-factor model with added 
liquidity factor, to calculate the alphas for each of the portfolios. The factors other than the 
Pastor-Stambaugh traded liquidity factors are originally from Kenneth French’s website, 
though obtained from the WRDS. The Pastor-Stambaugh traded liquidity factors are obtained 
from the WRDS. All the factors are at monthly frequency. 
The factors in the models include the market excess return over the risk-free rate, small market 
capitalization minus big market capitalization factor (SMB), high book-to-market minus low 
book-to-market factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), and the traded liquidity factor 
(TLF). The SMB factor describes the returns from a strategy of buying the companies with a 
small market capitalization and selling the companies with a high market capitalization 
capturing the small firm effect. On the other hand, the HML factor describes the returns of a 
strategy of buying the companies with a high book-to-market valuation and selling the 
companies with a low book-to-market valuation capturing the value premium. Furthermore, the 
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momentum factor describes the effect of buying the winners based on the share price 
performance 12 months prior to portfolio formation less the return over the most recent month 
and selling the losers based on the same performance measurement. Lastly, the Pastor-
Stambaugh liquidity factor captures the effect of buying the stocks with high sensitivities to 
aggregate liquidity and selling the stocks with low sensitivities to aggregate liquidity describing 
the liquidity premium. 
 
4.3 Mutual fund holdings 
The mutual fund holdings data is obtained from CRSP Mutual Fund database. The database 
comprises portfolio specific holdings on a security level. The data is available from the 
beginning of 2001. However, the number of records is considerably low for 2001, and thus, I 
exclude the data for 2001 and use the data from 2002 to 2013 for the analysis.   
I obtain fund specific holdings on a security level and securities’ percentages of total net assets. 
The data that I use includes all the portfolios that have at least 80% but not more than 100% of 
a fund’s assets invested in the U.S. equities (stocks listed in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ). 
The dataset comprises 9,097 mutual fund holdings reports per year on average. The lowest 
number of mutual fund holdings reports, 403 in total, is observed in 2002, while highest number 
of mutual fund holdings reports, 22,231 in total, is observed in 2012.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
Previous studies (most recently Baker and Haugen (2012), Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro 
(2014), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)) have examined the relationship between risk and return 
in the stock markets by measuring stocks’ riskiness either with beta or volatility. Then, based 
on the risk measure, stocks are ranked based on the risk and sorted into deciles, quintiles or 
quartiles. These portfolios are then used to measure the performance of assets having different 
levels of risk, and ultimately to examine how risk and return are associated. I follow similar 
methodology in this study by sorting stocks into deciles based on their historical volatility.  
In the following, I present the methodology used in the calculation of stock volatilities, 
construction of the decile portfolios and in the estimation of the decile portfolio alphas 
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controlled for the market performance, size, value, momentum and liquidity effects are 
presented. Lastly, I describe the methodology used in determining the mutual fund portfolios’ 
relative exposure to the volatility deciles. For comparison, Table 1 presents the methodologies 
that have been used in the previous low risk anomaly research.  
 
Table 1: Methodologies in the previous research 
This table shows the methodologies used in the previous research. The key components that vary 
between studies on low risk anomaly include sample period, sample market, limitations that are applied 
to the sample selection, risk measure and risk measurement period, data frequency and portfolio 
construction methodology. 
 
 
4.4.1 Volatility estimation 
In this study, historical monthly volatility is used as the measure of risk. I calculate 12-, 36- and 
60-month volatilities using monthly excess returns for each stock, and based on these, construct 
decile portfolios to empirically study the relationship between risk and return. I focus on the 
results based on 12-month volatility, and as a robustness check, report the key results also based 
on 36- and 60-month volatilities. The volatilities are calculated as follows: 
Paper Sample 
period
Market(s) Sample 
selection 
limitations
Risk 
measure(s)
Risk 
measurement 
period
Data 
frequency
Portfolio 
construction
Blitz and van 
Vliet (2007)
1986-
2006
U.S., European 
and Japanese 
stocks
Large caps Beta and 
volatility
36 months, and 12 
months as 
robustness test
Weekly 
returns
Deciles; equally 
weighted portfolios
Baker, 
Bradley, and 
Wurgler 
(2010)
1968-
2008
U.S. stocks All / Top 1000 
based on 
market cap
Beta and 
volatility
60 months but at 
least 24 months
Monthly 
returns
Quintiles; value-
weighted portfolios
Baker and 
Haugen (2012)
1990-
2011
21 developed 
and 12 
emerging 
stocks markets
99.5% of the 
capitalization 
in each country
Volatility 24 months Monthly 
returns
Deciles; value-weighted 
for developed, equal-
weighted for emerging 
markets
Baker, 
Bradley, and 
Taliaferro 
(2013)
1968-
2012
U.S. stocks No limitations Beta 60 months but at 
least 12 months
Monthly 
returns
Quintiles; value-
weighted portfolios
Frazzini and 
Pedersen 
(2014)
1926-
2012
U.S. stocks No limitations Beta 12 months for 
volatilities, 60 
months for 
correlations
Daily 
returns
Deciles; equally 
weighted portfolios
Methodologies used in previous research
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𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑁 = √
1
𝑁
[(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜇)
2
+ (𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝜇)
2
+ ⋯ + (𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑁 − 𝜇)
2
] ( 3 ) 
where 
 𝑁 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,  
𝑖 = 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 , 
𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘′𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑,  
𝑟 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇, and 
𝜇 =
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑁). 
 
4.4.2 Construction of volatility ranked portfolios and calculating portfolio returns 
At the end of each month, I assign stocks into ten decile portfolios, each comprising 10% of all 
stocks, by ranking stocks based on estimated volatility. The stocks that belong to the lowest 
10% based on their past volatility are assigned into the Decile 1, D1, and so on. The decile 
portfolios are monthly rebalanced. For each decile portfolio, I calculate the return in excess of 
the U.S. Treasury bill rate over the month following the portfolio formation. Both equally 
weighted and value-weighted returns are calculated. I primarily focus on the results based 
equally weighted portfolios constructed based on 12-month historical volatilities. I also report 
the results for the value-weighted portfolios based on 12-month historical volatilities as well as 
the results based on 36-month and 60-month volatilities for both equally weighted and value-
weighted portfolios. Using the resulting time series, I calculate the average excess returns, 
standard deviations, Sharpe ratios and alphas for the decile portfolios. 
 
4.4.3 Portfolio alphas controlled for market, value, size, momentum, and liquidity 
To control for the other well-known anomalies such as value, size and momentum as well as 
for liquidity effect, I follow the methodology used in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and regress 
alphas against the CAPM (Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)), Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model, Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and lastly, against Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) five-
factor model. The CAPM alpha is the abnormal return over the market portfolio, three-factor 
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alpha is over the market portfolio, the small company effect and the value effect, the four-factor 
alpha is over the previous effects as well as over the momentum effect, and lastly, the five-
factor alphas takes also the illiquidity effect into account. 
The alphas are estimated using the following regressions 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖    ( 4 ) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  ( 5 ) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  ( 6 ) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑙𝑖𝑇𝐿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ( 7 ) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the excess return over the risk-free rate on a decile portfolio i at time t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the 
excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio at time t, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the Fama-French 
small-minus-big size factor at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the Fama-French high-minus-low value factor at 
time t, 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 is the Carhart momentum factor at time t, 𝑇𝐿𝐹𝑡 is the Pastor-Stambaugh traded 
liquidity factor at time t, and 𝛽𝑖, 𝑠𝑖, ℎ𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑙𝑖 are the estimated factor exposures, 𝛼𝑖 is the 
alpha adjusted for control factors and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  
 
4.4.4 Mutual funds’ relative exposures to volatility deciles 
The CRSP mutual fund holding data includes portfolio holdings on a security-level. I analyse 
the portfolios that have at least 80% but not more than 100% of a fund’s assets invested in the 
U.S. equities (stocks listed in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) to make comparison between 
portfolio allocations and the CRSP value-weighted index meaningful. As previously 
mentioned, I obtain the data of all the stocks in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for creating 
volatility deciles and examining the relationship between volatility and return in these markets. 
Because this data practically includes all the stocks in these three stock markets, and therefore 
in the CRSP value-weighted index, I can determine how the market portfolio is distributed 
across the volatility deciles using volatility decile portfolios and their construction. Thereafter, 
I use this information to calculate the mutual funds’ allocations relative to the CRSP value-
weighted index, or the market portfolio.   
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Each month and for every mutual fund, when sufficient amount of holdings reports is available, 
I calculate the aggregate percentages that have been allocated into stocks in the volatility 
deciles. If no investments have been made into stocks in a particular decile, a fund’s allocation 
to that decile is naturally zero. Then, I compare a mutual fund’s allocation in a particular decile 
to the market portfolio’s allocation in that decile. I compute decile overweights by subtracting 
the market portfolio’s allocation in a particular decile from a mutual fund’s allocation in the 
same decile at certain point of time. If a mutual fund has a greater allocation, say in the first 
decile, than the market portfolio, then the mutual fund has an overweight in that decile, and 
vice versa. Using this methodology for all the mutual funds, I obtain a dataset comprising 
mutual funds’ relative allocations in the volatility deciles from 2002 to 2013.  
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5. RESULTS 
This chapter presents and discusses the results from empirical analyses regarding the key 
research questions of the thesis. The first part examines the relationship between risk and 
expected return over the whole sample period from 1974 to 2013 as well as during four separate 
10-year sub-sample periods. The second part concentrates on the existence of the low volatility 
anomaly under different market conditions by separating the periods of declining and rising 
stock market, and then discusses whether the anomaly is persistent over a stock market cycle 
or does it diminish when the stock market trend is upward. The third part of this chapter 
examines the mutual fund holdings and mutual funds’ relative holdings in ten volatility deciles 
in order to find whether mutual fund portfolio managers typically overweight volatile stocks 
relative to the market portfolio while underweighting stocks with lower volatility. Finally, I 
provide results confirming the robustness of the findings in the earlier sections with regards to 
the volatility estimation period and to the weights used in the portfolio construction. 
 
5.1 The relationship between risk and return  
The focus of this section is on the existence and persistence of the low volatility anomaly over 
the past 40 years and four separate 10-year sub-sample periods. The first subsection 
concentrates on the whole sample, whereas the second subsection examines the sub-sample 
periods. 
 
5.1.1 Low volatility anomaly in the full sample 
The results in this subsection contribute to the evidence on the existence of the anomaly. The 
subsection tests hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 over a long timeframe from 1974 to 2013. The next 
subsection returns to the same hypotheses but examines these over a shorter timeframes. An 
extensive set of literature has reported confirmatory results that low risk stocks have higher 
expected returns than high risk stocks (e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker et al. (2010), 
Baker and Haugen (2012), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)). Literature also finds that it is 
persistent (Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), Baker and Haugen (2012)) – existing now and far 
back in time.  Furthermore, it is remarkable because it is not apparent only in the U.S. equity 
markets but across equity markets both in developed countries and emerging markets, in 
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Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and futures (Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), Baker and Haugen 
(2012)).  
With a sample of 479 month-observations comprising 4,266 common stocks on average per 
month, I find that low volatility stocks have higher risk-adjusted returns than high volatility 
stocks and the risk-adjusted returns, or Sharpe ratios, are almost monotonically decreasing with 
volatility. Table 2 present the excess returns, alphas, realized betas, volatilities and Sharpe ratios 
for volatility sorted portfolios. Over the period from 1974 to 2013 in the main U.S. equity 
markets, the lowest volatility decile experiences much higher and more significant alpha than 
the higher volatility deciles in all four testing frameworks. Furthermore, the excess return 
differences between the volatility sorted deciles are fairly small, expect for the 10% highest 
volatility, compared to the differences in alphas and volatilities. Therefore, I find strong 
evidence supporting the first three hypotheses concerning the low volatility anomaly. 
 
i) Excess returns 
With regards to excess returns for the equally weighted decile portfolios, there is neither a 
clearly positive nor negative relationship between volatility and excess returns. Monthly excess 
returns range from 0.63% to 0.92%, except for the highest volatility decile, for which the excess 
return is close to zero at 0.01%. Highest excess returns are experienced by the third and fourth 
deciles, monthly excess return at 0.92% for the both deciles. The deciles from the second lowest 
volatility up to the sixth decile experience somewhat higher excess returns than the lowest 
volatility decile. Interestingly, the lowest volatility decile outperforms the four highest volatility 
deciles presenting anomalous returns between low and high volatility stocks. However, the low 
volatility anomaly is not consistent throughout the different portfolios as the risk-return 
relationship is positive in the low volatility end. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the low 
volatility anomaly would be fully observable in terms of absolute returns – a result that is in 
line with the hypothesis H3.  
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Table 2: U.S. Equity Returns, 1/1974-11/2013 
This table shows the returns of volatility sorted portfolios: at the beginning of each calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their estimated past 12-month volatility at the end 
of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to decile portfolios. Panel A shows the results 
for portfolios in which all stocks are equally weighted, whereas the Panel B shows the results for 
portfolios in which all stocks are given weights based on their market capitalization. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every month. This table includes all available common stocks on the CRSP database between 
January 1974 and November 2013. The rightmost column (MKT) reports returns of the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio. Excess returns are over the risk-free rate. Alpha is the intercept in a 
regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and 
French (1993) mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) traded liquidity factor. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below 
the coefficient estimates. Beta (realized) is the regression coefficient on the market portfolio. Volatilities 
and Sharpe ratios are annualized. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Equal-weights D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.81 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.77 0.68 0.63 0.01 0.80 0.48
CAPM alpha 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.40 0.37 0.27 0.18 0.16 -0.37 0.88
(5.65) (4.93) (4.63) (4.04) (3.14) (2.40) (1.46) (0.83) (0.59) (-1.10)
3-factor alpha 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.73 1.01
(3.84) (2.79) (2.58) (1.96) (0.99) (0.34) (-0.45) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-2.97)
4-factor alpha 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.19 -0.42 0.70
(3.88) (3.30) (3.52) (3.27) (3.00) (2.63) (2.09) (1.27) (1.13) (-1.75)
5-factor alpha 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.17 -0.42 0.68
(3.59) (3.09) (3.30) (3.11) (2.76) (2.46) (1.88) (1.19) (1.04) (-1.72)
Beta (realized) 0.56 0.77 0.88 0.97 1.05 1.14 1.24 1.35 1.44 1.52 -0.96 1.00
Volatility 11.25 14.16 16.13 17.65 19.45 21.61 24.22 27.39 30.62 35.18 -23.93 16.08
Sharpe ratio 0.87 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.55 0.48 0.38 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.86 0.36
Stocks sorted by 12-month volatility - full sample 1974-2013
Panel B: Value-weights D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.17 0.01 -0.61 1.19 0.48
CAPM alpha 0.26 0.08 0.12 0.08 -0.08 -0.21 -0.12 -0.38 -0.51 -1.10 1.35
(2.69) (1.01) (1.75) (1.19) (-0.90) (-1.76) (-0.82) (-2.04) (-2.16) (-3.86)
3-factor alpha 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.13 -0.18 -0.08 -0.38 -0.53 -1.18 1.38
(2.62) (0.33) (0.84) (0.57) (-1.42) (-1.63) (-0.65) (-2.46) (-2.79) (-5.29)
4-factor alpha 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.24 -0.32 -1.03 1.20
(2.27) (-0.04) (1.24) (1.11) (-0.68) (-0.45) (0.08) (-1.58) (-1.72) (-4.58)
5-factor alpha 0.18 -0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.20 -0.27 -0.95 1.14
(2.37) (-0.08) (0.93) (1.01) (-0.61) (-0.35) (0.20) (-1.32) (-1.43) (-4.23)
Beta (realized) 0.66 0.86 1.00 1.11 1.21 1.32 1.39 1.52 1.64 1.70 -1.04 1.00
Volatility 12.80 14.84 16.91 18.57 20.57 23.06 24.77 28.17 31.76 34.65 -21.85 16.08
Sharpe ratio 0.55 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.26 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.01 -0.21 0.76 0.36
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For the value-weighted portfolios, similar conclusions can be drawn: highest excess returns are 
experienced by the third and fourth deciles, although the returns are lower, at 0.60%, compared 
to the situation when equal-weights are applied. Yet, when the portfolios are constructed using 
value-weights, the lowest volatility decile is close to being the top performer in terms of 
absolute excess return, return difference being only 0.01% per month compared to returns for 
the third and fourth deciles. Again, the differences in monthly excess returns are fairly small 
except for the highest volatility deciles: the returns fall significantly for the eighth, ninth and 
tenth deciles. 
For the value-weighted portfolios, similar conclusions can be drawn: highest excess returns are 
experienced by the third and fourth deciles, although the returns are lower, at 0.60%, compared 
to the situation when equal-weights are applied. Yet, when the portfolios are constructed using 
value-weights, the lowest volatility decile is close to being the top performer in terms of 
absolute excess return, return difference being only 0.01% per month compared to returns for 
the third and fourth deciles. Again, the differences in monthly excess returns are fairly small 
except for the highest volatility deciles: the returns fall significantly for the eighth, ninth and 
tenth deciles.  
Previous studies that conclude superior performance for the low risk stocks in terms of absolute 
excess returns (e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker et al. (2010), Baker and Haugen (2012)), 
typically compare the performance of the lowest risk decile or quintile to that of the highest risk 
decile or quintile, while ignoring the returns for the portfolios in between these two. Based on 
the results in this paper, highest excess returns are experienced by the deciles with median or 
slightly below the median volatility. By looking only at the low and high volatility ends, my 
results also support the statement that the stocks with the lowest 10% volatility deliver higher 
absolute returns than the stocks with the highest 10% volatility. 
 
ii) Alphas 
In equally weighted portfolios, alphas for the lowest volatility decile are statistically highly 
significant and clearly positive, monthly alphas ranging from 0.26% to 0.51%. The CAPM 
alphas and 3-factor alphas decline almost monotonically with risk, being negative for the 
highest volatility decile. Monthly alpha-spreads between the lowest and the highest volatility 
deciles range from 0.68% to 1.01% depending on the testing framework. However, the alpha 
41 
 
for the lowest volatility decreases, when the SML and HML factors are added to the CAPM 
framework, which indicates that the positive performance of the low volatility stocks can be 
attributed to either size or value effect to some extent. Still, the good performance is not fully 
linked to the size and value effects, and even less to momentum and illiquidity premium because 
the alpha remains positive and statistically significant after adding all these factors. Therefore, 
low volatility stocks earn positive alpha beyond size, value and momentum effects, and beyond 
illiquidity premium. Furthermore, the alphas decrease also for all the other deciles when the 
size and value factors are included indicating that there are notable amount of stocks in each 
decile that earn either size or value premium. 
With regards to value-weighted portfolios, similar conclusions can be drawn. Yet, the alphas 
for the lowest risk decile are somewhat lower – although still statistically significant and 
positive – in the value-weighted portfolios than in equally weighted portfolios. Even more 
remarkable are the deeply negative alphas for the highest risk decile, alphas being statistically 
significant ranging from -0.95% to -1.18% per month. The same applies for all the other deciles 
that alphas are notably lower when the portfolios are constructed using value-weights instead 
of equal-weights. This indicates that the size effect indeed has a notable positive effect on stock 
returns and the effect can be found in stocks with different levels of volatility. Lastly, the alphas 
for the lowest five deciles decrease further when the SML and HML factors are added to the 
CAPM framework. This is likely to be attributable to the value effect as the alphas were already 
deteriorated by the value-weighting making the size effect less dominant.   
Consistent with the above results, the previous literature unanimously finds positive and mostly 
significant alpha for the lowest risk decile or quintile. Furthermore, the alpha-spread between 
the lowest risk and the highest risk has been found to be substantial (Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014), Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013), Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2010), Blitz and 
van Vliet (2007), Ang et al. (2006)). The reported annual alpha-spreads are in favor of the 
lowest risk, spreads ranging from 2.56% up to 16.20% varying based on the sample period, 
testing framework, whether beta or volatility is used as a risk measure and the universe of stocks 
that has been studied. Typically CAPM alpha-spreads are higher than 3-factor alpha-spreads, 
whereas 3-factor alpha-spreads are higher than 5-factor alpha-spreads (Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014), Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Ang et al. (2006)). Moreover, the alpha-spread is higher 
when all the stocks are included without market cap limitations compared to alpha-spread for 
top 1,000 largest stocks for example (Baker et al. (2010)).  
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iii) Sharpe ratios 
As mentioned above, I find that low volatility stocks have higher risk-adjusted returns than high 
volatility stocks. Additionally, the risk-adjusted returns are decreasing with volatility almost 
linearly. Equally weighted portfolio of the lowest volatility decile delivered Sharpe ratio of 0.87 
over the sample period, while the Sharpe ratio for the highest volatility decile was practically 
zero. The Sharpe ratio for the lowest volatility deciles was almost 2.5 times higher than that of 
the market portfolio showing a significance outperformance for the low volatility stocks in risk-
adjusted terms. The results are roughly similar for the value-weighted portfolios: Sharpe ratios 
are again decreasing with volatility almost linearly and the Sharpe ratio spread between the 
lowest volatility and the highest volatility deciles is significant at 0.76. In comparison, the 
spread is 0.86 for the equally weighted portfolios. However, the outperformance compared to 
the value-weighted market portfolio is not as dramatic as it is in the case of equally weighted 
portfolios. The Sharpe ratio of 0.55 for the low volatility decile compared to that of the market 
portfolio, 0.36, is 1.5 times higher. These findings, that low risk stocks significantly outperform 
high risk stocks, are in line with the research by Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker et al. (2010), 
Baker and Haugen (2012) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). 
I previously noted the excess return differences are fairly small and not the highest for the 
lowest volatility decile. By definition, volatility is lowest for the first decile and highest for the 
tenth decile. The difference in annual volatility between the first and the tenth decile is around 
24% in the equally weighted portfolios (22% in the value-weighted portfolios). The finding that 
Sharpe ratios decline almost linearly with volatility is therefore driven by large differences in 
volatilities and very small differences in absolute excess returns – or by the fact that absolute 
returns do not increase with risk as predicted by the finance theory. In summary, I find a clear 
evidence supporting both the hypothesis H1 and the H2. 
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5.1.2 Low volatility anomaly in the sub-sample periods 
In this part, I examine the relationship between risk and expected return over the sub-sample 
periods. The whole sample period is split into four 10-year periods: 1/1974-12/1983, 1/1984-
12/1993, 1/1994-12/2003 and 1/2004-11/2013. I use equally weighted portfolios to study the 
relationship during these periods. The Table 3 present the results for the four sub-sample 
periods, Panel A for the first period, Panel B for the second, Panel C for the third, and Panel D 
for the last sub period. The results in this subsection extend the knowledge of the low volatility 
anomaly and its persistence over the past 40 years. The subsection further tests hypotheses H1, 
H2 and H3 by examining shorter sub-periods within the whole sample from 1974 to 2013.  
With four sub-sample periods, each having 120 month-observations except the last one that 
comprises 119 month-observations, I find that stocks with lower volatility have generally higher 
risk-adjusted returns than stocks with higher volatility. Yet, the negative relationship between 
volatility and risk-adjusted returns is not as linear for all the sub-sample periods as it is for the 
whole sample. Again, the lowest volatility decile is typically among the portfolios that 
experience the highest alpha and the positive alphas are typically most significant for the lower 
volatility deciles. Interestingly, the excess return differences between the volatility sorted 
deciles vary more across the sub-sample periods and the lowest volatility decile actually 
delivers the highest absolute excess return of all of the portfolios over two separate sub-sample 
periods. The lowest volatility decile also has higher absolute excess return than the highest 
volatility decile in all the sub-samples, although in the first and the last sub-sample the return 
for the first decile is lower than the return for the second to ninth volatility decile. 
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Table 3: U.S. Equity Returns, Sub-sample periods 
This table shows the returns of volatility sorted portfolios: at the beginning of each calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their estimated past 12-month volatility at the end 
of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to decile portfolios. Panel A shows the results 
for equally weighted portfolios during 11/1994-12/2000, Panel B shows the results for equally weighted 
portfolios during 1/2001-12/2006, and Panel C shows the results for equally weighted portfolios during 
1/2007-11/2012. The portfolios are rebalanced every month. The results are based on all available 
common stocks on the CRSP database between November 1994 and November 2012. The rightmost 
column reports returns of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. Excess returns are over the risk-
free rate. Alpha is the intercept in a regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are 
the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor. Returns and alphas are in monthly 
percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated 
in bold. Beta (ex ante) is the weighted average estimated 12-month beta at portfolio formation. Beta 
(realized) is the regression coefficient on the market portfolio. Volatilities and Sharpe ratios are 
annualized. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Subperiod 1 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-1983 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.82 1.09 1.21 1.29 1.35 1.43 1.39 1.43 1.30 0.62 0.20 0.27
CAPM alpha 0.60 0.80 0.90 0.97 1.01 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.02 0.47 0.13
(2.80) (4.07) (4.08) (4.09) (3.90) (3.49) (3.09) (2.82) (2.26) (0.84)
3-factor alpha 0.07 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.02 -0.14 -0.22 -0.48 -1.38 1.45
(0.43) (1.58) (1.42) (1.47) (1.07) (0.14) (-1.06) (-1.29) (-2.24) (-4.96)
4-factor alpha 0.33 0.41 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.10 -0.02 -0.17 -0.47 -1.48 1.81
(2.50) (4.16) (3.04) (2.82) (2.01) (0.78) (-0.17) (-0.98) (-2.11) (-5.14)
5-factor alpha 0.35 0.39 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.04 -0.01 -0.21 -0.51 -1.42 1.77
(2.61) (3.89) (2.56) (2.47) (1.64) (0.30) (-0.09) (-1.17) (-2.24) (-4.88)
Beta (realized) 0.71 0.90 1.02 1.08 1.16 1.19 1.29 1.36 1.41 1.50 -0.79 1.00
Volatility 14.63 17.30 19.46 20.61 22.31 23.77 25.80 27.81 29.69 33.27 -18.63 17.27
Sharpe ratio 0.67 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.65 0.62 0.52 0.22 0.45 0.18
Stocks sorted by 12-month volatility, equally weighted portfolios
Panel B: Subperiod 2 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1984-1993 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.75 0.67 0.66 0.59 0.44 0.26 0.21 -0.02 -0.16 -0.17 0.92 0.63
CAPM alpha 0.35 0.15 0.09 0.00 -0.15 -0.33 -0.37 -0.59 -0.67 -0.58 0.93
(2.79) (1.13) (0.60) (0.03) (-0.63) (-1.11) (-1.15) (-1.52) (-1.42) (-0.96)
3-factor alpha 0.23 0.11 0.13 0.07 -0.02 -0.16 -0.14 -0.40 -0.50 -0.55 0.78
(2.23) (1.52) (1.91) (0.97) (-0.23) (-1.11) (-0.92) (-1.72) (-1.59) (-1.23)
4-factor alpha 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.24 -0.32 -0.42 0.59
(1.69) (1.57) (2.35) (1.71) (0.76) (-0.20) (-0.04) (-1.05) (-1.01) (-0.91)
5-factor alpha 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.24 -0.31 -0.41 0.58
(1.66) (1.55) (2.33) (1.68) (0.75) (-0.20) (-0.01) (-1.04) (-0.98) (-0.88)
Beta (realized) 0.59 0.81 0.92 0.97 1.01 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.06 0.99 -0.41 1.00
Volatility 10.35 13.69 15.53 16.83 18.22 20.10 20.68 22.56 24.29 27.49 -17.14 15.74
Sharpe ratio 0.87 0.59 0.51 0.42 0.29 0.16 0.12 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.95 0.48
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i) Excess returns 
The excess return pattern varies from period to period to the extent that neither a clear positive 
nor negative relationship between volatility and excess return can be found. With regards to the 
first subperiod from 1974 to1983 and the last subperiod from 2004 to 2013, excess returns are 
increasing with volatility up to the sixth decile, after which the returns deteriorate with 
volatility. Whereas for the second and the third subperiods, the pattern shows clearly negative 
– although not linear – relationship between volatility and excess returns: in the low volatility 
end, excess returns decrease slightly with volatility while decreasing more towards the high 
volatility end. One remarkable finding that applies across the subperiods is that the lowest 
volatility decile outperforms the highest volatility decile. Additionally, the outperformance is 
substantial over the last three subperiods, differences in excess returns between the lowest and 
the highest volatility deciles ranging from 0.88% to 1.20% per month. In the first subperiod, 
the outperformance is less dramatic, excess return difference being 0.20% per month. Although 
Panel C: Subperiod 3 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1994-2003 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 1.15 1.04 1.05 1.04 0.94 0.80 0.89 0.63 0.67 -0.05 1.20 0.52
CAPM alpha 0.91 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.51 0.34 0.39 0.17 0.21 -0.34 1.26
(4.56) (3.70) (3.13) (2.63) (1.72) (0.93) (0.81) (0.27) (0.29) (-0.37)
3-factor alpha 0.55 0.34 0.25 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.26 -0.01 0.56
(3.82) (2.73) (1.86) (1.36) (0.39) (0.00) (0.53) (0.20) (0.53) (-0.02)
4-factor alpha 0.59 0.42 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.38 0.73 0.77 1.01 0.68 -0.09
(4.01) (3.36) (2.93) (2.70) (2.31) (1.88) (2.61) (2.16) (2.52) (1.18)
5-factor alpha 0.59 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.34 0.37 0.70 0.75 0.98 0.66 -0.07
(3.93) (3.26) (2.83) (2.60) (2.16) (1.81) (2.48) (2.08) (2.40) (1.12)
Beta (realized) 0.32 0.46 0.58 0.69 0.83 1.01 1.22 1.40 1.68 1.87 -1.54 1.00
Volatility 9.19 10.70 12.61 14.62 17.53 21.29 26.95 32.24 38.30 46.45 -37.26 16.30
Sharpe ratio 1.50 1.17 1.00 0.86 0.64 0.45 0.40 0.24 0.21 -0.01 1.51 0.38
Panel D: Subperiod 4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
2004-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.54 0.61 0.75 0.77 0.86 1.02 0.64 0.73 0.78 -0.33 0.88 0.52
CAPM alpha 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.37 0.00 0.05 0.09 -0.99 1.18
(1.94) (1.20) (1.64) (1.27) (1.42) (1.72) (-0.01) (0.15) (0.23) (-2.25)
3-factor alpha 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.30 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -1.09 1.27
(1.86) (1.14) (1.84) (1.41) (1.57) (1.88) (-0.41) (-0.15) (-0.03) (-2.81)
4-factor alpha 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.35 -0.01 0.05 0.10 -1.00 1.17
(1.77) (1.21) (2.32) (1.89) (2.34) (2.62) (-0.05) (0.24) (0.38) (-2.75)
5-factor alpha 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.33 -0.05 0.06 0.09 -0.98 1.15
(1.73) (1.14) (2.12) (1.65) (2.11) (2.42) (-0.36) (0.29) (0.34) (-2.66)
Beta (realized) 0.62 0.91 1.03 1.14 1.22 1.30 1.40 1.56 1.65 1.73 -1.11 1.00
Volatility 10.08 14.27 16.30 18.13 19.52 21.21 23.06 26.15 28.63 30.82 -20.75 15.12
Sharpe ratio 0.64 0.51 0.56 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.33 0.34 0.33 -0.13 0.77 0.41
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the results do not show a clear volatility anomaly in terms of absolute excess returns, which is 
in line with the hypothesis H3, they do not support the traditional theory that risk bearing can 
be expected to produce a reward either. 
  
ii) Alphas 
The low volatility stocks appear to deliver positive alpha over all the subperiods. However, the 
statistical significance is somewhat weaker than in the full sample and slightly below 5% 
significance under certain testing frameworks. In most cases, the lowest three volatility deciles 
are among the portfolios with the highest and most significant alpha except for the most recent 
period, where the middle deciles experience the highest alphas. Furthermore, the highest 
volatility deciles perform the worst in terms of alpha, and alpha for the highest volatility decile 
is typically negative. These findings extend the evidence that low volatility stocks earn a 
premium that cannot be explained by the traditional factors including market, size, value, 
momentum and liquidity factors. 
 
iii) Sharpe ratios 
The sub-sample results provide further evidence on the persistence of low volatility anomaly in 
risk-adjusted terms: the low volatility end has significantly higher Sharpe ratios than the high 
volatility end, and the Sharpe ratios are almost consistently decreasing with volatility in all the 
sub-sample periods, supporting the hypothesis H1. Furthermore, the difference in Sharpe ratios 
between the lowest volatility decile and the highest volatility decile ranges from 0.45 up to 1.51. 
Generally, the volatility differences are driving the anomaly together with the relatively small 
differences in absolute returns for the neighboring deciles, consistent with the hypothesis H2. 
Volatility differences between bottom and top decile are within the range from around 17% up 
to 37%. The anomaly is further strengthened by the good absolute excess returns experienced 
by the low volatility stocks – the lowest volatility portfolio even has the highest absolute return 
in the second and third sub-sample period. Lastly, there is usually are dramatic drop in risk-
adjusted performance when moving from the ninth decile to the highest volatility decile. 
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5.2 Low volatility anomaly in different market conditions 
The focus of this section is on the performance of volatility sorted portfolios during periods 
when the market declines, and secondly, when the market rises. The rising and declining periods 
are defined over the period from 1994 to 2013 for the reason that prior to 1994 the general 
market was trending mostly upwards. The subsection tests the hypothesis H4 whether the 
anomaly is a persistent phenomenon over a stock market cycle, or is it primarily associated with 
either declining or rising market conditions. Table 4 presents excess returns, alphas, realized 
betas, volatilities and Sharpe ratios for the volatility sorted portfolios separately for periods of 
declining and rising stocks market. 
Blitz and van Vliet (2007) finds that the low risk portfolios underperform the market during up 
market months, while outperforming the market during down market months. Furthermore, 
they find that the underperformance during up months is considerably smaller than the 
outperformance during down months. Yet, this effect is countered to some extent by more 
frequent occurrence of up months, 59% of up months versus 41% of down months in their 
sample. 
 
5.2.1 Returns during declining stock markets 
There are two separate periods when the stock market was clearly trending downwards during 
the period from 1994 to 2013: the first market decline occurred from April 2000 to September 
2002 following the dot-com bubble. The second period when the general market trended 
downwards, was from November 2007 to February 2009 and it was triggered by a large decline 
in home prices in the U.S. that lead to subprime borrowers defaulting on their mortgage 
payments and devaluation of housing-related securities – known as the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis that resulted in the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a former global financial services firm. 
Panels B and D of the Table 4 present the performance of the volatility sorted portfolios during 
declining stock markets. 
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i) Excess returns 
Based on the finance theory, it would be natural that the performance of more volatile stocks is 
worse in terms of absolute excess returns compared to the stocks with lower volatility. This also 
appears to be the case based on the data. The excess returns are declining almost monotonically 
with volatility, the monthly return differences between the bottom and the top decile being 
2.62% for the period associated with subprime crisis and staggering 6.08% for the period 
following the dot-com bubble. The performance is not only less negative for the low volatility 
deciles but actually highly positive in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble, the bottom decile 
experiencing 1.48% monthly excess return over the 30-month period of market decline. This 
indicates that the stock market was willing to overpay significantly for certain stocks during the 
bubble resulting in very poor future returns for these stocks – some of these companies are 
likely those dot-com firms that went bankrupt, while other stocks were significantly 
undervalued and not of interest to a broad investor base.  
 
ii) Alphas 
Not surprisingly, knowing the great absolute performance of the low volatility deciles after the 
dot-com bubble, the low volatility stocks earned highly significant alpha during the period from 
April 2000 to September 2002. The alphas are positive and clearly significant for the bottom 
three deciles, whereas the higher volatility deciles have positive but insignificant alphas. During 
the second period from November 2007 to February 2009, all 3-, 4- and 5-factor alphas are 
negative for all deciles, yet mostly insignificant. Alpha-spreads between the bottom and top 
decile range from 0.85% up to 1.50% per month during the first market decline and from 1.67% 
up to 3.58% per month during the decline causes by the subprime crisis. 
 
iii) Sharpe ratios 
The Sharpe ratio patterns across the deciles for the two separate periods are contradictory: 
during the first observation period, Sharpe ratios are clearly declining in volatility and the 
Sharpe ratio spread between the bottom and top decile is extremely high, at 2.92. For the second 
observation period, however, Sharpe ratios are the lowest for the bottom two volatility deciles, 
while the deciles five and nine have the least negative Sharpe ratios. Thus, there is no clear 
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relationship between risk-adjusted returns and volatilities during this period. Therefore, the 
findings are mixed and support the hypothesis H4 only partly. 
Compared to the first period, all the Sharpe ratios are within a fairly narrow range from -2.35 
for the bottom decile to -1.70 for the ninth decile. Furthermore, the difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between the bottom and top decile is 0.39 in favor of the top decile. So far, the results 
have consistently supported the previous findings that low risk stocks have generally higher 
risk-adjusted returns than high risk stocks. The observations for the period following the burst 
of subprime crisis contradict with the evidence supporting the existence of the low volatility 
anomaly. Furthermore, these findings do not fully support the conclusion by Blitz and van Vliet 
(2007) that low risk portfolios outperform the market during down market months.  
 
5.2.2 Returns during rising stock markets 
There are three separate periods when the stock market was clearly trending upwards during 
the period from 1994 to 2013: the first from January 1994 to March 2000, the second from 
October 2002 to October 2007, and the last from March 2009 to November 2013. Panels A, C 
and E of the Table 4 present the performance of the volatility sorted portfolios during rising 
stock markets. 
 
i) Excess returns 
The excess return pattern is consistent over the three periods of rising stock market. Generally, 
the bottom volatility decile experiences the lowest absolute excess return when the stock market 
goes up, and additionally, the excess return increases with volatility up to the ninth decile. The 
top decile typically has an excess return that is in between that of the bottom and the ninth 
deciles. Again, as during the periods of declining stock market, the relationship between 
absolute return and volatility – except for the top volatility decile – is positive as predicted by 
the theory. However, the relationship is too flat to justify the increase in volatility as observed 
from the pattern of declining Sharpe ratios towards the high volatility end. 
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ii) Alphas 
Although the relationship between absolute excess return and volatility is positive when the 
market goes up, interestingly, low volatility deciles deliver higher and more significant alphas 
than the higher volatility portfolios. This result applies for the two most recent periods when 
the market trended upwards – during the upward trend from January 1994 to March 2000, the 
alphas for all deciles were smaller and mostly insignificant. 
The finding that low volatility portfolios actually experience positive and significant alphas is 
contradicting with the conclusion by Blitz and van Vliet (2007) that these portfolios 
underperform the market during up market months. The good performance of low volatility 
portfolios when the market goes up cannot be explained by the traditional market, size, value, 
momentum and liquidity factors. The finding is remarkable for the reason that the 
outperformance of low volatility stocks is expected to be related to downward trends in the 
market rather than to the upward trends in the market. The finding is also an indication that the 
low volatility anomaly may not be limited only the periods when the stock market declines but 
is potentially a phenomenon that is persistent over stock market cycle. 
 
iii) Sharpe ratios 
Indeed, low volatility stocks perform remarkably well in risk-adjusted terms when the general 
stock market rises. Sharpe ratios for the bottom volatility decile over the three periods are 0.89, 
1.88 and 2.30 compared to the Sharpe ratio of 0.36 for the market portfolio over the whole 40-
year sample period. Furthermore, Sharpe ratios are almost consistently decreasing in volatility, 
the top volatility decile having the lowest risk-adjusted return in all three sample periods. The 
spread in risk-adjusted returns between the bottom and top decile range from 0.50 up to 1.52 in 
favor of the bottom decile. These findings contradict with the hypothesis H4 and show that the 
low volatility anomaly is actually more consistent during periods of rising stocks market. 
In addition to the positive and significant alphas for the low volatility deciles when the market 
trends upward, the risk-adjusted returns are higher for lower volatility stocks too. The result 
confirms that low volatility anomaly is not limited periods when the stock returns are low, and 
the general market is declining, but it appears to be a persistent phenomenon over stock market 
cycle. Additionally, low volatility portfolios are less volatile when the market is rising 
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compared to periods when the market is declining. This contributes further to the extremely 
good risk-adjusted performance of the low volatility stocks. 
 
Table 4: U.S. Equity Returns, Association with market performance 
This table shows the returns of volatility sorted portfolios: at the beginning of each calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their estimated past 12-month volatility at the end 
of the previous month. 
 
 
Panel A: Rising market 1 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1/1994-3/2000 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.71 0.77 0.79 0.97 0.90 0.91 1.13 1.25 1.34 1.17 -0.46 1.38
CAPM alpha 0.08 -0.04 -0.14 -0.05 -0.22 -0.26 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.08
(0.32) (-0.14) (-0.56) (-0.18) (-0.64) (-0.59) (-0.26) (-0.07) (-0.02) (0.00)
3-factor alpha 0.10 -0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.12 -0.12 0.03 0.16 0.24 0.32 -0.23
(0.60) (-0.10) (-0.68) (0.07) (-0.56) (-0.46) (0.10) (0.39) (0.52) (0.47)
4-factor alpha 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.46 0.57 0.69 0.64 -0.53
(0.62) (1.28) (1.15) (1.99) (1.45) (0.98) (1.48) (1.33) (1.47) (0.88)
5-factor alpha 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.48 0.60 0.70 0.64 -0.53
(0.63) (1.30) (1.23) (2.10) (1.62) (1.11) (1.53) (1.42) (1.47) (0.87)
Beta (realized) 0.47 0.60 0.70 0.77 0.86 0.91 1.03 1.07 1.17 1.18 -0.71
Volatility 9.63 11.07 12.21 13.68 15.41 17.64 21.30 24.42 28.78 36.50 -26.88 14.06
Sharpe ratio 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.85 0.70 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.56 0.38 0.50 1.18
Stocks sorted by 12-month volatility, equally weighted portfolios
Panel B: Declining market 1 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
4/2000-9/2002 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 1.48 0.98 0.73 0.25 -0.33 -1.03 -1.59 -2.76 -3.30 -4.61 6.08 -2.02
CAPM alpha 1.98 1.86 1.99 1.93 1.74 1.84 2.11 1.46 1.88 0.48 1.50
(4.83) (4.31) (3.59) (3.16) (2.24) (1.98) (1.55) (0.87) (1.08) (0.22)
3-factor alpha 1.19 0.90 0.78 0.69 0.34 0.57 1.18 0.72 1.63 0.34 0.85
(3.63) (3.46) (2.04) (1.43) (0.50) (0.64) (0.86) (0.45) (1.03) (0.19)
4-factor alpha 1.14 0.86 0.70 0.58 0.16 0.35 0.84 0.32 1.28 0.07 1.07
(3.75) (3.81) (2.30) (1.62) (0.38) (0.58) (0.88) (0.29) (1.04) (0.05)
5-factor alpha 1.13 0.83 0.67 0.51 0.04 0.26 0.71 0.12 1.09 -0.04 1.17
(3.63) (3.69) (2.19) (1.50) (0.12) (0.44) (0.75) (0.11) (0.91) (-0.03)
Beta (realized) 0.27 0.41 0.56 0.73 0.88 1.22 1.55 1.85 2.30 2.57 -2.30
Volatility 8.76 10.78 14.30 17.33 21.43 28.14 37.57 45.55 52.82 61.53 -52.77 18.91
Sharpe ratio 2.02 1.09 0.61 0.17 -0.19 -0.44 -0.51 -0.73 -0.75 -0.90 2.92 -1.28
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Panel C: Rising market 2 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
10/2002-10/2007 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 1.01 1.10 1.36 1.51 1.71 1.99 1.99 2.04 2.50 1.71 -0.70 1.11
CAPM alpha 0.47 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.47 0.27 0.14 0.21 -0.75 1.22
(2.61) (1.99) (2.20) (2.05) (1.50) (1.49) (0.73) (0.29) (0.34) (-1.00)
3-factor alpha 0.35 0.22 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.39 0.28 0.15 0.28 -0.54 0.89
(2.42) (1.92) (3.30) (3.21) (2.01) (2.24) (1.34) (0.46) (0.59) (-0.85)
4-factor alpha 0.36 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.44 0.34 0.27 0.47 -0.31 0.67
(2.41) (1.84) (3.25) (3.18) (2.59) (2.76) (1.78) (0.99) (1.20) (-0.56)
5-factor alpha 0.40 0.24 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.62 -0.22 0.61
(2.56) (1.98) (3.64) (3.17) (3.19) (2.85) (2.10) (1.51) (1.53) (-0.38)
Beta (realized) 0.47 0.67 0.79 0.90 1.13 1.30 1.53 1.72 2.08 2.48 -2.01
Volatility 6.48 7.92 9.35 10.58 13.14 15.21 17.79 20.94 25.90 31.06 -24.57 9.93
Sharpe ratio 1.88 1.67 1.75 1.71 1.56 1.57 1.34 1.17 1.16 0.66 1.22 1.34
Panel D: Declining market 2 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
11/2007-2/2009 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return -2.59 -3.35 -3.52 -3.76 -3.82 -3.97 -4.43 -4.67 -4.50 -5.20 2.62 -3.49
CAPM alpha -0.28 0.10 0.11 0.38 0.36 0.13 -0.08 -0.27 0.08 -1.95 1.67
(-0.79) (0.21) (0.17) (0.64) (0.47) (0.15) (-0.08) (-0.23) (0.06) (-1.09)
3-factor alpha -0.35 -0.36 -0.60 -0.33 -0.61 -0.81 -1.26 -1.40 -1.44 -3.48 3.13
(-0.83) (-0.88) (-1.08) (-0.62) (-0.90) (-0.99) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.03) (-1.97)
4-factor alpha -0.26 -0.27 -0.46 -0.24 -0.45 -0.69 -1.06 -1.28 -1.24 -3.30 3.05
(-0.73) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-0.49) (-0.84) (-0.89) (-1.13) (-1.07) (-0.92) (-1.86)
5-factor alpha -0.31 -0.39 -0.65 -0.60 -0.80 -1.09 -1.75 -1.73 -1.77 -3.89 3.58
(-0.82) (-1.16) (-1.72) (-1.85) (-1.96) (-1.58) (-2.84) (-1.47) (-1.35) (-2.15)
Beta (realized) 0.63 0.97 1.03 1.17 1.19 1.20 1.33 1.40 1.39 1.28 -0.64
Volatility 13.21 20.01 21.60 24.31 25.18 25.57 29.09 30.55 31.78 31.81 -18.59 19.98
Sharpe ratio -2.35 -2.01 -1.96 -1.85 -1.82 -1.86 -1.83 -1.83 -1.70 -1.96 -0.39 -2.10
Panel E: Rising market 3 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
3/2009-11/2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 1.75 2.17 2.46 2.50 2.79 3.15 2.86 3.53 3.56 2.13 -0.38 2.02
CAPM alpha 0.57 0.38 0.33 0.15 0.23 0.35 0.02 0.21 -0.04 -1.28 1.84
(3.67) (2.35) (1.54) (0.59) (0.76) (0.96) (0.04) (0.39) (-0.06) (-1.84)
3-factor alpha 0.58 0.42 0.38 0.22 0.31 0.48 0.13 0.35 0.15 -1.06 1.63
(3.79) (3.88) (2.73) (1.57) (1.56) (1.81) (0.42) (0.81) (0.27) (-1.83)
4-factor alpha 0.58 0.42 0.38 0.22 0.31 0.47 0.12 0.33 0.13 -1.07 1.65
(4.44) (3.87) (2.95) (1.90) (1.95) (2.50) (0.63) (1.19) (0.34) (-2.15)
5-factor alpha 0.56 0.40 0.38 0.19 0.28 0.45 0.14 0.25 0.10 -1.19 1.75
(4.26) (3.68) (2.87) (1.70) (1.80) (2.39) (0.70) (0.92) (0.24) (-2.42)
Beta (realized) 0.56 0.85 1.02 1.15 1.24 1.33 1.40 1.60 1.79 1.89 -1.33
Volatility 9.11 13.36 16.13 18.18 19.83 21.70 23.07 27.04 30.84 32.72 -23.60 14.98
Sharpe ratio 2.30 1.95 1.83 1.65 1.69 1.74 1.49 1.57 1.38 0.78 1.52 1.62
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5.3 Mutual funds’ relative exposures to volatility deciles 
The focus of this section is on the mutual fund holdings and relative equity positions in the 
volatility sorted deciles compared to the construction of the market portfolio. The results in this 
section contribute to the explanations for the low volatility anomaly. In particular, the section 
tests the hypothesis H5. The data of mutual fund holdings covers only the recent period from 
2002 to 2013 due to data limitations. The mutual fund holdings data is from the CRSP Mutual 
Fund Holdings database. 
The literature has provided several explanations for the anomaly, many of them relating to 
institutional investors’ tendency to overweight risky stocks. Firstly, the CAPM assumes 
unrestricted borrowing and lending of risky assets, although regular mutual funds typically have 
restrictions on borrowing for investment purposes. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) argue that 
borrowing restrictions cause investors to leverage by overweighting risky assets, and thus, the 
prices of risky assets are inflated resulting in lower expected return.  
Secondly, Blitz and van Vliet (2007) raise a problem related to decentralized investment 
approach and market benchmarks. They describe that an asset manager is typically responsible 
for making capital allocation decision within certain asset class after asset allocation decision 
across asset classes is made by an investment committee. Furthermore, the success of the capital 
allocation made by the manager is measured against a market benchmark which creates an 
incentive to tilt towards high beta or high volatility stocks, they argue, because it would be a 
way to generate above average returns, if the CAPM holds at least partially. Baker et al. (2010) 
also raise the same issue and note that many institutional investors are measured against fixed 
benchmarks, typically capitalization weighted, which discourage investing in low risk stocks. 
Thirdly, Baker and Haugen (2012) explain that typical manager compensation schedule and 
other agency issues related to portfolio construction have a similar effect causing a portfolio 
manager to construct a portfolio that is likely to be more volatility rather than less volatile. At 
first they argue that the expected value of a manager’s compensation increases with portfolio 
volatility due to an option-like compensation payoff in a situation where the compensation 
consists of a base salary and a bonus when the performance is sufficiently high. Moreover, they 
raise other agency issues that further inflate the demand for high volatility stocks. One 
explanation is that analysts tend to recommend noteworthy stocks for which they can 
confidently make a compelling investment case in order to impress the CIO and fellow analysts. 
However, these stocks tend to receive a good amount of both news and analyst coverage which 
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both increase the volatility of these stocks, Baker and Haugen argue. Moreover, the second 
argument is that it is easier for a portfolio manager to explain the changes in a model portfolio, 
when the newly included stocks are interesting by nature, supported with newsworthiness and 
a decent amount of news and analyst coverage – all which tend to increase the volatility of these 
stocks. 
Taking all these explanations into account, I expect that mutual fund managers overweight 
risky, high volatility stocks and underweight stocks with lower volatility. Table 5 shows the 
average market portfolio construction per year as well as the average mutual fund allocations 
per year. Table 6 presents relative positions of equity-dominated, non-levered U.S. mutual 
funds against a value-weighted market portfolio. In other words, Table 6 shows which are the 
volatility deciles that mutual fund portfolio managers typically underweight and overweight.  
The Figure 4 is a graphical presentation of this. Each month and for every mutual fund, when 
sufficient amount of holdings reports is available, I calculate the aggregate percentage that has 
been allocated into stocks in a particular volatility decile. Then, I compare the average 
allocation percentages each month to the market portfolio’s allocation. The results are presented 
on an annual level. Market portfolio distribution and mutual fund holdings in the volatility 
deciles are presented as averages of individual observations per year. The mutual funds’ relative 
overweights (or underweights) per decile are presented both as averages and medians of all 
observations per year. Based on the data, the largest proportion of the total market capitalization 
in the U.S. equity markets fall into the bottom three deciles meaning that the least volatile stocks 
typically include companies with high market capitalization. On contrary, the high volatility 
deciles include companies with low market capitalization. 
I find that, over the period from 2002 to 2013, mutual fund managers significantly underweight 
the stocks in the bottom deciles. Since 2004, the average underweight in the bottom decile has 
varied between -9.3 and -13.5 percentage points relative to the market portfolio’s allocation. 
Median underweight in the bottom decile has been even deeper and the underweight has varied 
between -11.2 and -14.6 percentange points since 2004. Furthermore, mutual fund managers 
overweight the stocks with higher volatility, in particular the stocks in the top six deciles, 
relative to the market portfolio. The average overweight on these portfolios has been between 
0.1 and 2.0 percentage points most of the time.  However, the median overweight in the top six 
deciles is lower varying -1.0 and 1.0 most of the time, indicating that some portfolio managers 
overweight the high volatility stocks more than the others. Interestingly, the results show that 
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rather than significantly overweighting high volatility stocks, most of the mutual fund portfolio 
managers actually prefer to underweight low volatility stocks. 
In addition to the evident underweight in low volatility stocks, the underweight has been fairly 
persistent over the period from 2002 to 2013. This also shows that mutual fund managers do 
not decrease the risk of their portfolios below the market portfolio during market turmoil and 
when the general trend is downward, for example in 2008, when the market was declining in 
the aftermath of the subprime crisis. In 2002, after the burst of the dot-com bubble, however, 
the underweight in low volatility stocks was less severe than during the following years. 
In summary, I find clear evidence that supports the hypothesis H5. The results present an 
evidence that portfolio managers indeed cause a slight excess demand to high volatility stocks 
and even more significant demand shortage to low volatility stocks. As a result, if the market 
impact of mutual fund managers’ trades is significant, this partly explains why high volatility 
stocks are overpriced and have too low future returns relative to risk, and why low volatility 
stocks are underpriced and have too high future returns relative to risk. The results are in line 
with the proposed explanations for the anomaly including restrictions on borrowing that is 
assumed to cause investors and portfolio managers to leverage by increased risk-taking (Blitz 
and van Vliet (2007), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)), benchmarking that may cause portfolio 
managers to tilt their portfolios towards high volatility stocks (Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker 
et al. (2010)), and manager compensation and agency issues that encourage investing in stocks 
with higher volatility (Falkenstein (1994), Karceski (2002), Baker and Haugen (2012)). The 
finding provides significant evidence on the low volatility anomaly and is among first studies 
to report that mutual fund portfolios managers, on average, underweight low volatility stocks 
significantly, and additionally, overweight high volatility stocks as proposed in the previous 
literature. 
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Table 5: Market portfolio distribution and mutual fund holdings 
This table shows both the market portfolio’s construction and mutual fund holdings in volatility sorted 
deciles. First, Panel A shows the market portfolio’s construction as averages of monthly observations, 
i.e. the share of market capitalization of CRSP value-weighted index per volatility sorted decile. 
Volatility breakpoints are defined for the universe comprising stocks in the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. CRSP value-weighted index comprises stocks listed in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. 
Second, Panel B shows annual average values of mutual fund holdings in stocks listed in the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ. Mutual funds include portfolios that invest 80% to 100% of net assets in the 
stocks listed in the three market places.  
 
  
Panel A: 2002-2013 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10
% of the market Low volatility High volatility Diff.
2002 15.9 25.4 18.3 15.1 8.0 7.4 5.6 1.9 1.4 0.9 15.0
2003 19.9 19.2 15.7 15.1 9.7 10.1 4.8 2.6 1.6 1.1 18.8
2004 31.4 23.2 13.1 12.0 7.1 5.7 3.4 2.0 1.3 0.8 30.6
2005 32.8 17.9 13.8 14.2 7.8 5.1 3.9 2.5 1.4 0.6 32.1
2006 24.4 24.3 19.3 9.6 6.9 5.9 4.9 2.5 1.5 0.7 23.7
2007 27.8 24.7 15.7 9.8 8.0 5.5 3.6 2.5 1.7 0.6 27.2
2008 33.2 20.8 13.0 9.2 7.6 5.3 4.4 3.8 1.8 0.9 32.2
2009 37.0 20.8 11.4 8.7 6.6 4.8 4.0 2.3 2.9 1.6 35.4
2010 31.4 20.2 15.6 10.7 8.6 4.7 3.2 2.6 2.2 0.9 30.5
2011 29.9 20.9 13.7 12.1 9.0 5.6 3.3 3.0 1.7 0.8 29.1
2012 30.6 21.2 13.1 9.9 7.4 6.6 5.3 3.3 1.8 0.8 29.8
2013 30.0 21.4 14.3 10.5 8.7 6.5 3.9 2.2 1.7 0.8 29.2
2002-2013 average 28.7 21.7 14.7 11.4 7.9 6.1 4.2 2.6 1.8 0.9 27.8
2002-2013 median 30.3 21.1 14.1 10.6 7.9 5.7 3.9 2.5 1.7 0.8 29.5
Panel B: 2002-2013 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10
% of net assets Low volatility High volatility Diff.
2002 11.0 19.4 16.2 14.4 8.4 7.7 6.6 2.9 2.4 1.3 9.7
2003 12.7 14.0 14.4 14.0 10.4 9.8 6.5 4.2 2.7 1.4 11.4
2004 19.0 17.0 12.9 12.1 9.1 7.8 5.3 3.5 2.3 1.1 17.9
2005 20.2 14.1 12.7 13.3 9.4 7.3 5.5 4.1 2.2 0.9 19.3
2006 15.1 17.0 15.2 10.5 8.7 8.3 7.0 4.1 2.8 1.1 14.0
2007 18.0 18.1 14.3 10.6 9.1 7.2 5.3 3.9 2.3 0.7 17.3
2008 21.7 17.0 12.6 10.0 8.3 6.6 5.5 4.2 2.3 1.1 20.6
2009 23.5 18.4 12.4 10.0 7.8 6.3 5.1 3.1 2.7 1.7 21.8
2010 20.8 17.7 14.6 11.0 9.2 6.0 4.3 3.1 2.4 1.1 19.6
2011 18.5 17.7 13.2 12.2 9.7 7.0 4.7 3.9 2.5 1.1 17.5
2012 18.5 16.9 13.1 10.4 8.5 7.8 5.9 4.6 2.9 1.1 17.4
2013 18.9 16.5 14.0 10.9 9.4 7.3 5.2 3.4 2.4 0.9 18.0
2002-2013 average 18.2 17.0 13.8 11.6 9.0 7.4 5.6 3.8 2.5 1.1 17.0
2002-2013 median 18.7 17.0 13.6 11.0 9.1 7.3 5.4 3.9 2.4 1.1 17.6
Market portfolio distribution, average decile weights
Mutual fund holdings, average decile weights
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Table 6: Relative allocations of mutual funds 
This table shows the differences in decile weights between mutual fund holdings and the market 
portfolio distribution, i.e. mutual funds’ overweight (underweight) per decile per year. Panel A present 
the average overweights (underweights) based individual observations per year per decile. Panel B 
present the median overweights (underweights) based individual observations per year per decile. 
 
 
  
Panel A: 2002-2013 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10
%-pts. difference Low volatility High volatility Diff.
2002 -4.9 -6.0 -2.1 -0.7 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.4 -5.3
2003 -7.2 -5.1 -1.3 -1.1 0.7 -0.3 1.7 1.5 1.0 0.2 -7.5
2004 -12.4 -6.2 -0.2 0.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.3 -12.7
2005 -12.6 -3.8 -1.1 -0.9 1.6 2.2 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.2 -12.8
2006 -9.3 -7.3 -4.0 0.9 1.8 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.3 0.4 -9.6
2007 -9.8 -6.6 -1.4 0.8 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.4 0.6 0.2 -10.0
2008 -11.4 -3.8 -0.4 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 -11.6
2009 -13.5 -2.4 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.8 -0.2 0.1 -13.6
2010 -10.6 -2.5 -1.0 0.3 0.6 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 -10.9
2011 -11.3 -3.3 -0.5 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.3 -11.6
2012 -12.1 -4.4 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.1 0.3 -12.4
2013 -11.1 -5.0 -0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.1 -11.2
2002-2013 average -10.5 -4.7 -0.9 0.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.2 -10.8
2002-2013 median -11.2 -4.7 -0.8 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.2 -11.5
Panel B: 2002-2013 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10
%-pts. difference Low volatility High volatility Diff.
2002 -4.7 -5.0 -1.6 -1.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -4.0
2003 -7.6 -4.7 -1.1 -1.1 0.1 -0.9 0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -6.9
2004 -13.3 -5.3 -0.4 -0.3 1.5 1.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -12.6
2005 -14.2 -3.4 -1.0 -0.8 1.2 1.2 0.4 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -13.5
2006 -11.8 -7.2 -4.2 0.4 1.3 1.8 1.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -11.1
2007 -11.2 -6.5 -1.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -10.7
2008 -12.0 -3.3 -0.9 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -11.4
2009 -14.6 -2.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.9 -0.7 -13.9
2010 -12.1 -2.4 -1.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -11.4
2011 -12.5 -2.7 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -11.9
2012 -14.2 -4.1 -0.5 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -13.5
2013 -12.5 -4.9 -0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -11.9
2002-2013 average -11.7 -4.3 -1.1 -0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -11.1
2002-2013 median -12.3 -4.4 -0.9 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 -11.6
Mutual fund holdings vs. market portfolio distribution, average decile overweights
Mutual fund holdings vs. market portfolio distribution, median decile overweights
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Figure 4: Mutual fund holdings relative to market portfolio 
Figure 4 shows an illustration of equity-dominated, non-levered U.S. mutual funds’ allocations relative 
to market portfolio, the CRSP value-weighted market index, over the period from 2002 to 2013. The 
figure is a graphical presentation of the data in Table 6. Allocations are presented as relative over-
weights (or underweights when the sign is negative) in terms of percentage point difference compared 
to the market portfolio. Both average and median overweights per year are presented. For example, if 
common stocks within the lowest 10% volatility (D1) comprise 20% of the market portfolio, and a 
mutual fund has allocated 15% of its assets into these stocks at certain point of time, the relative 
overweight for the fund is -5% (i.e. underweight in this case). Equity-dominated means that between 
80% and 100% of a mutual fund’s total assets are invested in equities, while non-levered means that a 
mutual fund do not use leverage, i.e. a fund neither borrows money nor has short positions in any stocks.   
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5.4 Robustness to weights in the portfolio construction 
The analysis in this thesis is primarily based on the portfolios that are constructed using equal-
weights for the portfolio constituents. Additionally, the results for the full sample period from 
1974 to 2013 are also calculated using value-weights, i.e. market capitalization weights, for the 
constituents in order to verify the consistency of results in both settings. Panel B of the Table 2 
in the section 5.1.1 presents the results for value-weighted portfolios that are created using 12-
month volatility estimation period. Panel B’s of the Appendices 2 and 3 present the results for 
value-weighted portfolios but using 36-month and 60-month volatility estimation periods, 
respectively. 
The results are relatively similar for both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios: in both 
settings, the lowest volatility decile clearly outperforms the highest volatility decile in absolute 
excess return terms, while the best performance is observed for some of the portfolios from 
third to sixth decile. Yet, equal-weighting appears to be better for all the deciles and the excess 
returns are clearly higher for portfolios constructed using equal-weights instead of value-
weights across. Secondly, the low volatility deciles deliver positive and statistically significant 
alpha, whereas high volatility deciles show negative or zero alpha in both settings. The 
statistical significance of low volatility portfolios’ alphas, however, is clearly higher, when the 
portfolios are constructed using equal-weights. Lastly, for both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios, the Sharpe ratios are almost monotonically declining with volatility. 
Similar to excess returns, the Sharpe ratios are clearly higher for equal-weighted portfolios, 
which is obviously driven by the higher excess returns for these portfolios. In addition, equal-
weighted portfolios also appear to have mostly lower volatilities than value-weighted 
portfolios. In summary, the low volatility anomaly is present both in equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios, although it is stronger when equal portfolio weights are applied.  
 
5.5 Robustness to the volatility estimation period 
In this thesis, the analysis is primarily based on the portfolios that are created by sorting stocks 
by the volatility of total monthly returns over the past 12 months. I also calculate the full sample 
results using extended volatility estimation periods. In particular, both 36-month and 60-month 
estimation periods are used to obtain supplementary results and check whether the findings are 
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robust to different estimation periods. The results using 36- and 60-month volatility estimation 
periods are presented in Panel A’s in the appendices 2 and 3, respectively. 
The results using 36-month and 60-month volatility estimation periods are similar to the results 
using 12-month volatility estimation periods: the excess returns are gradually increasing with 
volatility, except for the three top volatility deciles. Lowest volatility decile also outperforms 
the highest volatility decile regardless of the estimation period, although the volatility 
estimation period extension weakens the outperformance slightly the longer the estimation 
period is. Furthermore, the low volatility portfolios exhibit positive and significant alphas even 
if the estimation period is extended from 12 months to 36 and 60 months. The statistical 
significance of the alphas decreases only slightly when a longer estimation period is used. 
Lastly, the relationship between volatility and Sharpe ratios remains negative across the 
different volatility estimation period setups. In summary, the length of the volatility estimation 
period has surprisingly small effect on the results, results being only slightly stronger for the 
shortest estimation period. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to study the persistence and the significance of the low volatility 
anomaly during the past 40 years. The thesis examined the phenomenon over a long 40-year 
sample period, over shorter sub-sample periods as well as separately during different market 
conditions. In addition, motivated by the previous research suggesting that mutual funds 
overweight risky assets (e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2010), 
Baker and Haugen (2012), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)), the thesis studied U.S. mutual fund 
holdings and examined whether portfolio managers actually overweight high volatility stocks, 
and therefore, cause excess demand, overpricing and low future returns for these stocks. 
The findings in this thesis challenge the standard asset pricing models such as the CAPM by 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). The findings with regards to stocks returns over the past 40 
years show that risk bearing is not well rewarded, and the highest volatility deciles have lower 
absolute excess returns and lower Sharpe ratios than the lowest volatility deciles. Moreover, the 
alphas for the highest volatility deciles are insignificant or even negative. At the same time, low 
volatility stocks have had surprisingly good absolute excess returns, clearly positive and 
significant alphas, and remarkably high Sharpe ratios. In addition, the Sharpe ratios are not only 
higher for the low volatility stocks but decrease almost monotonically with volatility. These 
findings are in line with the previous research and many recent papers report similar results 
(e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker et al. (2010), Baker and Haugen (2012) and Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2014) for beta and returns). It is worth noting, however, that the absolute excess 
returns are not monotonically decreasing with volatility but the absolute returns are the highest 
for the stocks with median or slightly below median volatility – a finding that has not been 
made very clear in the previous literature. 
The findings for the sub-sample periods are similar to the findings based on the full sample 
period. For the three most recent sub-sample periods, Sharpe ratios are the highest for the lowest 
volatility decile and the Sharpe ratios decrease almost monotonically with volatility. In the first 
sub-sample period, the lowest volatility decile does not quite deliver the highest Sharpe ratio 
but is still among the best performing deciles. Again, the lowest volatility decile has higher 
absolute excess returns than the highest volatility decile, although the best absolute performance 
is experienced by the stocks close to median volatility. In two out of four sub-sample periods, 
alphas are the highest for the lowest volatility decile and decrease with volatility, while for the 
remaining two sub-sample periods, portfolios with median or below median volatility deliver 
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the highest and most significant alphas – alphas for the lowest volatility stocks not far behind 
though. To conclude the analysis, the low volatility anomaly exists primarily in risk-adjusted 
terms and risk-adjusted returns decrease almost monotonically with volatility. Furthermore, low 
volatility stocks earn positive and significant alphas, while high volatility stocks earn zero or 
even negative alphas. The findings concerning alphas and the relationship between volatility 
and risk-adjusted returns are clearly persistent over the whole sample period and mostly over 
the sub-sample periods. The negative relationship between volatility and risk-adjusted returns 
appear to be driven by large differences in volatilities and fairly small differences in absolute 
returns. However, although the relationship between volatility and absolute returns is mostly 
positive except at the high volatility end, also negative relationship between these two is 
observed during two of the four sub-sample periods, thus strengthening the negative 
relationship between volatility and risk-adjusted returns further during these periods. Lastly, in 
terms of absolute returns, the lowest volatility decile outperforms the highest volatility decile 
in all sample periods and the anomalous relationship between these two deciles actually exists. 
However, absolute returns are generally the highest for the stocks with median or close to 
median volatility, and therefore the anomalous relationship is not as consistent as it is in terms 
of risk-adjusted returns.  
With regards to the existence of the anomaly in different market conditions and over the stock 
market cycle, it appears that the anomaly is not attributable especially to either upward or 
downward trending market but is observed during both periods. The relationship between 
volatility and risk-adjusted returns is consistently negative for all the three periods of rising 
stock market. During the two periods of declining stock market, I observe one period with 
negative and one with positive relationship between volatility and risk-adjusted returns. 
Therefore, rather than being driven by periods of declining stocks market, the low volatility 
anomaly appears to exist especially during the rising stock market periods, when low volatility 
stocks have fairly high absolute returns and very low volatilities. 
Lastly, and most importantly, the thesis sheds light on the U.S. mutual fund holdings and 
provides new information on the topic by studying mutual fund allocations relative to a market 
benchmark from the perspective of the low volatility anomaly. The previous literature had 
proposed that investors and mutual fund managers are, for varying reasons, likely to tilt their 
portfolios towards high volatility and high beta stocks (e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker, 
Bradley and Wurgler (2010), Baker and Haugen (2012), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)), 
therefore causing excess demand and overpricing for the high risk stocks. Indeed, I was able to 
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show that an average mutual fund portfolio manager has a moderate overweight in high 
volatility stocks and additionally a significant underweight in low volatility stocks. Therefore, 
this thesis shows that the mutual fund allocations and risk preferences may actually be the 
underlying reason why the anomaly exists. 
This thesis provided an overview how mutual fund managers invest across the volatility deciles 
in the U.S. As this thesis, to my best knowledge, was the first study to show how investments 
in mutual fund portfolios are distributed across different volatility levels, future research needs 
to confirm if similar patterns exist in other markets, where the anomaly has been observed 
already. Additionally, because mutual funds are only one class of investors, though a dominant 
one (Blitz and van Vliet (2007)), it would be important to conduct a similar study covering the 
portfolios of other investor classes, such as portfolios of private investors or pension funds, to 
find out which investors prefer risky investments and which are the ones who rather invest in 
low risk stocks. Another suggestion for further research is to study the characteristics of the 
companies in the lowest volatility deciles. For example, are the low volatility stocks ones that 
have good and stable dividend yields from year to year but not so high growth prospects, 
therefore being stocks that are not that attractive for fund managers who are seeking growth 
instead of stable cash flow. Together with studying the stock characteristics, it would be 
valuable to study how the performance of stocks within one decile varies. Do all the stocks in 
the lowest volatility decile have good risk-adjusted returns and decent absolute returns, or are 
there certain stocks that should be excluded anyway from a low volatility portfolio. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Glossary of definitions 
 
Alpha Alpha is the return for a stock or a portfolio in excess of the return 
for benchmark. For example, benchmarks can include the market 
portfolio’s return and other common risk factors such as the 
returns for size and value strategies. Technically, alpha is the 
regression intercept of an asset pricing model such as the CAPM 
or the Fama-French three-factor model. 
Beta Beta is a risk measure that describes a stock’s sensitivity to the 
market portfolio. If a security’s beta is above one, say 1.5, and 
market portfolio goes up by 1.0%, then that security is expected 
to go up by 1.5%. The market portfolio has beta of one by 
definition. 
CAPM The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) is a model that describes the 
relationship between risk and expected return under certain 
assumptions. 
Decile 10 percent grouping of stocks. In this study, stocks are sorted by 
their historical volatilities and assigned into ten deciles.  
Excess return  Absolute return in excess of the risk-free rate. 
Equal-weighted In an equal-weighted portfolio, the same amount of money is 
invested in each stock.  
Idiosyncratic volatility Idiosyncratic volatility is the volatility of a stock’s returns that 
cannot be explained by the market risk (beta) or other common 
risk factors, and is typically defined as the standard deviation of 
the regression residual of the CAPM or Fama-French three-factor 
model. Idiosyncratic volatility is also referred as non-systematic 
risk or diversifiable risk, and it will not be priced into security 
68 
 
prices according to the CAPM framework because it can be 
eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio. 
Market portfolio In theory, market portfolio refers to the portfolio of all available 
assets. In this study, market portfolio also refers to the CRSP 
value-weighted market index. 
Quartile  25 percent grouping of stocks. 
Quintile  20 percent grouping of stocks. 
Risk-adjusted return See Sharpe ratio. 
Sharpe ratio Sharpe ratio describes a security’s return relative to its risk and it 
is calculated by dividing a security’s excess return by the 
security’s volatility. Also called as the risk-adjusted return. 
Value-weighted In a value-weighted portfolio, the amount of money that is 
invested in each stock is determined based on the market 
capitalizations of the stocks in the portfolio, i.e. higher the market 
capitalization, the higher is the weight. 
Volatility Volatility refers to standard deviation of returns, a statistical 
measure of the variability of returns over a defined period of 
time. 
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Appendix 2: U.S. Equity Returns, 36-month volatility estimation period, 1/1974 - 11/2013 
This table shows the returns of volatility sorted portfolios: at the beginning of each calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their estimated past 36-month volatility at the end 
of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to decile portfolios. Panel A shows the results 
for portfolios in which all stocks are equally weighted, whereas the Panel B shows the results for 
portfolios in which all stocks are given weights based on their market capitalization. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every month. This table includes all available common stocks on the CRSP database between 
January 1974 and November 2013. The rightmost column (MKT) reports returns of the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio. Excess returns are over the risk-free rate. Alpha is the intercept in a 
regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and 
French (1993) mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) traded liquidity factor. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below 
the coefficient estimates. Beta (realized) is the regression coefficient on the market portfolio. Volatilities 
and Sharpe ratios are annualized. 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Equal-weights D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.77 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.73 0.59 0.11 0.65 0.48
CAPM alpha 0.48 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.23 0.14 -0.25 0.73
(5.38) (5.05) (3.98) (3.50) (2.82) (2.39) (1.77) (1.00) (0.49) (-0.71)
3-factor alpha 0.25 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.19 -0.56 0.81
(3.55) (2.97) (1.40) (0.88) (0.31) (0.20) (-0.16) (-0.76) (-0.98) (-2.12)
4-factor alpha 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.15 -0.18 0.44
(3.57) (3.21) (2.33) (2.24) (2.13) (2.48) (2.26) (1.43) (0.83) (-0.71)
5-factor alpha 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.13 -0.21 0.45
(3.36) (3.14) (2.29) (2.14) (2.00) (2.31) (2.12) (1.28) (0.70) (-0.80)
Beta (realized) 0.53 0.76 0.86 0.96 1.05 1.15 1.26 1.37 1.44 1.54 -1.01 1.00
Volatility 10.83 13.95 15.73 17.44 19.54 21.99 24.74 27.70 31.28 36.26 -25.43 16.08
Sharpe ratio 0.85 0.72 0.63 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.41 0.31 0.23 0.04 0.81 0.36
Stocks sorted by 36-month volatility - full sample 1974-2013
Panel B: Value-weights D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.55 0.34 -0.17 -0.58 1.11 0.48
CAPM alpha 0.18 0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.22 -0.71 -1.07 1.26
(2.18) (1.52) (0.56) (-0.08) (-0.43) (-0.77) (-0.09) (-1.11) (-2.92) (-3.78)
3-factor alpha 0.16 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.24 -0.75 -1.12 1.27
(2.32) (1.09) (-0.44) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-1.09) (0.15) (-1.52) (-3.94) (-5.29)
4-factor alpha 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 -0.55 -0.96 1.08
(1.78) (0.69) (0.11) (0.23) (0.40) (-0.06) (1.01) (-0.41) (-2.91) (-4.53)
5-factor alpha 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.16 -0.03 -0.50 -0.93 1.07
(1.93) (0.78) (0.10) (0.35) (0.44) (-0.35) (1.19) (-0.17) (-2.63) (-4.37)
Beta (realized) 0.68 0.90 1.05 1.16 1.25 1.40 1.47 1.59 1.73 1.71 -1.03 1.00
Volatility 12.62 15.50 17.88 19.52 21.65 24.45 26.80 29.60 33.24 34.80 -22.18 16.08
Sharpe ratio 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.14 -0.06 -0.20 0.70 0.36
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Appendix 3: U.S. Equity Returns, 60-month volatility estimation period, 1/1974 - 11/2013 
This table shows the returns of volatility sorted portfolios: at the beginning of each calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their estimated past 60-month volatility at the end 
of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to decile portfolios. Panel A shows the results 
for portfolios in which all stocks are equally weighted, whereas the Panel B shows the results for 
portfolios in which all stocks are given weights based on their market capitalization. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every month. This table includes all available common stocks on the CRSP database between 
January 1974 and November 2013. The rightmost column (MKT) reports returns of the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio. Excess returns are over the risk-free rate. Alpha is the intercept in a 
regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and 
French (1993) mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) traded liquidity factor. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below 
the coefficient estimates. Beta (realized) is the regression coefficient on the market portfolio. Volatilities 
and Sharpe ratios are annualized. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Equal-weights D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.74 0.34 0.42 0.48
CAPM alpha 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.47 0.42 0.43 0.28 -0.02 0.48
(5.14) (5.00) (3.94) (3.57) (2.90) (3.01) (2.27) (1.92) (1.02) (-0.06)
3-factor alpha 0.24 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.08 -0.34 0.57
(3.30) (2.90) (1.32) (0.88) (0.14) (1.05) (0.47) (0.56) (-0.41) (-1.25)
4-factor alpha 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.21 0.06 0.18
(3.33) (3.27) (2.24) (2.05) (1.91) (3.50) (2.72) (2.67) (1.22) (0.24)
5-factor alpha 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.19 0.03 0.20
(3.16) (3.32) (2.37) (2.03) (1.87) (3.43) (2.61) (2.61) (1.07) (0.11)
Beta (realized) 0.54 0.77 0.87 0.96 1.05 1.13 1.26 1.33 1.42 1.49 -0.95 1.00
Volatility 11.03 14.05 15.85 17.45 19.45 21.60 24.48 27.18 30.58 35.90 -24.88 16.08
Sharpe ratio 0.82 0.71 0.62 0.59 0.53 0.54 0.46 0.41 0.29 0.11 0.71 0.36
Stocks sorted by 60-month volatility - full sample 1974-2013
Panel B: Value-weights D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 MKT
1974-2013 Low volatility High volatility Diff.
Excess return 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.45 0.50 0.68 0.60 0.23 -0.04 -0.35 0.85 0.48
CAPM alpha 0.16 0.10 0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.32 -0.58 -0.83 0.99
(1.93) (1.18) (0.93) (-0.83) (-0.39) (0.89) (0.18) (-1.73) (-2.59) (-2.89)
3-factor alpha 0.13 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 0.09 -0.36 -0.65 -0.89 1.02
(2.00) (0.58) (0.16) (-0.95) (-0.52) (0.99) (0.63) (-2.48) (-4.33) (-4.08)
4-factor alpha 0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.20 0.17 -0.24 -0.44 -0.67 0.76
(1.31) (0.51) (0.76) (-0.91) (0.72) (1.81) (1.26) (-1.65) (-3.07) (-3.10)
5-factor alpha 0.10 0.05 0.06 -0.09 0.05 0.18 0.19 -0.20 -0.44 -0.64 0.73
(1.44) (0.73) (0.86) (-1.07) (0.55) (1.63) (1.38) (-1.37) (-3.00) (-2.92)
Beta (realized) 0.69 0.91 1.05 1.16 1.27 1.36 1.47 1.57 1.67 1.69 -1.01 1.00
Volatility 12.74 15.91 17.79 19.58 22.03 23.95 26.94 28.94 31.66 34.70 -21.96 16.08
Sharpe ratio 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.27 0.34 0.27 0.10 -0.01 -0.12 0.60 0.36
